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QUEER SACRIFICE IN MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP
Jeremiah A. Ho ∗
ABSTRACT
This Article interprets the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
as a critical extension of Derrick Bell’s interest convergence thesis
into the LGBTQ movement. Chiefly, Masterpiece reveals how the
Court has been more willing to accommodate gay individuals who
appear more assimilated and respectable—such as those who
participated in the marriage equality decisions—than LGBTQ
individuals who are less “mainstream” and whose exhibited
queerness appear threatening to the heteronormative status quo.
When assimilated same-sex couples sought marriage in Obergefell
v. Hodges, their respectable personas facilitated the alignment
between their interests to marry and the Court’s interest in
affirming the primacy of marriage.
Masterpiece, however,
demonstrates that when the litigants’ sexual identities seem less
assimilated and more destabilizing to the status quo, the Court
becomes much less inclined to protect them from discrimination
and, in turn, reacts by reinforcing its interest to preserve the
status quo—one that relies on religious freedoms to fortify
heteronormativity. To push this observation further, this Article
explores how such failure of interest convergence in Masterpiece
extends Derrick Bell’s thesis on involuntary racial sacrifice and
fortuity into the LGBTQ context—arguing that essentially
Masterpiece is an example of queer sacrifice. Thus, using the
appositeness of critical race thinking, this Article regards the
reversal in Masterpiece as part of the contours of interest
convergence, queer sacrifice, and fortuity in the LGBTQ
movement. Such observations ultimately prompt this Article to
propose specific liberationist strategies that the movement ought
to adopt in forging ahead.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law. I
would like to thank Emma Wood, Jessica Dziedzic, Joseph Machado, Mary
McBride, Janice Small, Aleah Fisher, and Kayla Venckauskas for research
assistance. Also, much thanks to the University of Massachusetts School of
Law for funding this research.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Despite equality in marriage for same-sex couples, the
Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission 1 illustrates that the dominant
status quo is still able to pick and choose which moments to
discriminate against sexual minorities. This Article will show
how the impasse from fully reaching sexual orientation
antidiscrimination in Masterpiece is associated with the choices
1

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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that the gay movement has made with the visibility of sexual
minorities, particularly from the Court’s prior marriage cases.
Marriage equality is not true equality. Marriage equality
litigation purposely depicted same-sex couples as assimilated and
distinctively aligned with the dominant status quo in order to
increase the viability that the Court would extend marriage
rights. 2 In writing about Obergefell, others have noted that
eventual success was premised on this carefully-crafted image of
sameness, assimilation, and respectability because it allowed the
interests of same-sex couples in seeking marriage rights to
converge with the Court’s interests in affirming the
heteronormative institution of marriage. 3 Indeed, through such
an interpretation of Obergefell, some have borrowed Derrick Bell’s
well-regarded interest convergence thesis from critical race
theory and applied it to explain how the Court reached its
decision to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples. 4
In examining Masterpiece, this Article affirms and then
extends further such application of Bell’s thesis. It explores
Masterpiece as an example where interests failed to converge and
what that failure signifies. Deviating from its high regard for
assimilated same-sex couples in Obergefell, the Masterpiece Court
was unwilling to accommodate the less assimilated, less
seemingly-respectable queer identities of the same-sex couple
involved. Instead, their queerness led the Court to reinforce
interests in preserving the status quo—one that currently
protects religious exercise over the rights of sexual minorities. In
this way, the Article will render further analogies to Derrick
Bell’s racial justice theorizing—not only to his interest
convergence thesis but also his later theories on involuntary
racial sacrifice and fortuity—to explain how Masterpiece speaks
profoundly about the current progress of LGBTQ rights in the
post-marriage equality era. Applying Bell’s theory of involuntary
racial sacrifice, Masterpiece is ultimately a grave example of
See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 Yale L.J. F. 136 (2015).
Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 Cal. L. Rev.
Circuit 117, 122-24 (2015) [hereinafter Joshi, Respectable Dignity]; Neo Khuu,
Obergefell v. Hodges: Kinship Formation, Interest Convergence, and the Future
of LGBTQ Rights, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 184, 214-224 (2017).
4 Id.
2
3
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queer sacrifice. Nevertheless, the Article will also use Bell’s
theorizing to show invariably how sexual minorities ought to
forge ahead.
Beyond this Introduction, Part II explores assimilationist
strategies in both the gay movement and the marriage equality
sub-movement that culminated in the proliferation of sameness
and respectability archetypes that helped leverage marriage
equality. Part III first compares the assimilative characteristics
of the same-sex couples from Obergefell against the queer
sexualities of the Masterpiece couple. Then Part III examines
Masterpiece to show how the decision is an example of queer
sacrifice and what this sacrifice indicates for LGBTQ equality
going forward. Finally, before Part V’s conclusion, Part IV uses
guidance from Bell’s forged fortuity theory for solutions in the
movement’s next steps beyond Masterpiece.
II. ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES IN MARRIAGE EQUALITY
A. ASSIMILATION VERSUS LIBERATION - HISTORICAL TENSIONS
Questions of strategy have always embroiled themselves
centrally in the social and political advancements of sexual
minorities. Even in earlier mid-20th century efforts, various
incarnations of the American LGBTQ movement have pondered
and taken sides between embracing assimilationist strategies,
which insist on a rights-based perspective within the existing
liberal democratic regime, and liberationist strategies, which
assert change from a more revolutionary perspective outside the
dominant political discourse. 5 This basic tug-of-war between
strategies famously ripped through the Mattachine Society, an
early gay rights group that dominated over the homophile
movement of the 1950s—a precursor movement of the
contemporary LGBTQ crusade. 6 Initially, the Mattachine Society
embraced liberationist values and led the homophile movement
by organizing a militant following, igniting participant selfCRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE GAY AND LESBIAN
MOVEMENTS IN THE U NITED STATES 2 (2002) [hereinafter RIMMERMAN, FROM
IDENTITY TO POLITICS].
6 Id. at 21-22.
5
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awareness as an active minority group, and dedicating efforts
toward legal advancements and changes in public perceptions
Within the McCarthy Era,
against sexual minorities. 7
liberationist strategies and ideologies, which embodied
communist principles, eventually led to conflict within the
Mattachine Society, especially when “rank-and-file Mattachine
members grew increasingly concerned with the organization’s
possible association with communism.” 8 In the disagreement
between founding Mattachine leaders and its membership, the
central conflict between assimilation and liberation arose as
“[t]he Mattachine founders envisioned a separate homosexual
culture while other members worried that such a strategy would
only increase the hostile social climate.” 9
Unlike their
liberationist-entrenched leadership, the society’s newer members
“called for integration into mainstream society” and that conflict
led to change at the helms of the Mattachine in 1953. 10
Such change ultimately resulted in the homophile
movement’s abandonment of liberationist approaches for
assimilationist ones. 11 From the mid-1950s, this re-vamped
homophile movement focused on initiating dialogue with
mainstream society by presenting sexual minorities as upright
citizens in order to change public perceptions of homosexuality. 12
Specifically, “[t]heir strategy was to present themselves as
reasonable, well-adjusted people, hoping that these heterosexual
arbiters of public opinion would rethink their assumptions
regarding homosexuality.” 13 Unlike earlier tactics, the activists’
strategy now promoted sameness between the heterosexual
mainstream and sexual minorities: “This approach, rooted in
dialogue, emphasized conformity and attempted to minimize any
differences between heterosexuality and homosexuality.” 14 That
approach prevailed until the time of Stonewall in 1969. 15
Id. at 20-21.
Id.
9 Id. at 21.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 22.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
7
8
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After Stonewall, liberationist strategies gained more
traction as gay and lesbian activism of the late 1960s transitioned
to reflect the radical politics of the 1970s. 16 Assimilationist
strategies took a back-seat as the goal of many gay activists at
the time was to revolutionize society and not merely change
mainstream perceptions. 17 During this time, the work of the Gay
Liberation Front came to the forefront of the gay rights
movement by challenging status quo. 18 One of its noted works
involved mainstream representations of sexual minorities
through language and cultural imagery. Known as “visibility
rhetoric,” its use of language was important and essential for
achieving the social group identity of gays and lesbians. 19 For
instance, the word “homosexual” was replaced with “gay,” and the
consciousness of the group was reinforced with the word “pride.” 20
But as activism for sexual minorities entered the 1980s and
organizations within the movement began to play active roles in
national politics—particularly as the AIDS crisis and the
conservative Republican rise in the mainstream political sphere
prompted the urgency for national presence—assimilationist
strategies began to return to tactical prominence. 21 Preference
for assimilationist strategies deepened as marriage litigation in
the early 1990s directed the gay movement toward marriage
equality. 22 In litigating and changing public reactions to samesex marriages, activists shifted perceptions by crafting arguments
for “sameness” between same-sex and opposite-sex relationships
and by arguing for the human universality of being 23—arguments

Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
18 Id.
19 Jacobs, supra n. __, at 725-26.
20 RIMMERMAN, F ROM IDENTITY TO P OLITICS, supra n. __, at 24.
21 Id. at 28-29.
22 Carlos A. Ball, Introduction: The Past and the Future, in AFTER MARRIAGE
EQUALITY: THE FUTURE OF LGBT RIGHTS 3 (Carlos A. Ball ed., 2016).
23 Id.; see also CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN, T HE L ESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS:
ASSIMILATION OR LIBERATION? 147 (2008) [hereinafter RIMMERMAN, THE
LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS].
16
17
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that the homophile movement’s assimilationist strategies had
tried to instill a generation before. 24
B. MARRIAGE AS ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGY
When it comes to marriage, the movement’s attachment to
that idea has had a lengthy history and is nothing if not complex.
As Carlos Ball recounts, “[t]he question of marriage has been the
subject of discussion and activism from the beginning of the
LGBT rights movement in the United States.” 25 Although
deprived of the right to marry in the twentieth century, some
accounts exists of same-sex couples taking part in symbolic
marriage ceremonies over the decades prior to actualizing legal
recognition of same-sex marriages. 26 Then legal action took
shape. In the 1970s, same-sex couples in several states across the
U.S. also initiated lawsuits to obtain the right to marry. 27 At that
time, during the liberationist heyday, the underlying purpose of
these lawsuits focused more on the legal participation that
marriage would afford sexual minorities rather than any
integrationist notions of becoming part of the mainstream. 28
Exclusion from marriage meant that the rights and incidents of
marriage enjoyed by wedded opposite-sex couples eluded samesex couples. 29 Such desire for equal treatment was often the
actual goal of these early same-sex marriage suits, rather than
folding sexual minorities into the social fabric. 30 Unfortunately,
none of the same-sex couples who sued for the right to marry ever
prevailed in these early efforts—including Baker v. Nelson, which
was denied certiorari review by the Supreme Court. 31

24 Elizabeth J. Baia, Akin to Madmen: A Queer Critique of the Gay Rights

Cases, 104 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1027-28 (2018).
25 Ball, supra n. __, at 1.
26 Id.
27 E.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1974); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185,
185 (Minn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
28 Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 38-41 (2015) [hereinafter Boucai, Glorious Precedents].
29 RIMMERMAN, T HE L ESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS, supra n. __, at 139-40.
30 Boucai, Glorious Precedents, supra n. __, at 4.
31 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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Notwithstanding feminist critiques of marriage as a
patriarchal institution, gay rights thinkers also exhibited
apprehension toward marriage. The now-classic 1989 debate
between Paula Ettelbrick and Tom Stoddard published in
Out/Look
Magazine
exposes
the
assimilationist-versusliberationist tensions that activism and ultimately obtaining the
right to marry would bring. 32 Ettelbrick and Stoddard were both
colleagues at the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, but shared
profound differences on the idea of same-sex marriage. 33
Ettelbrick held views against same-sex marriage while Stoddard
Their debate illustrated quite
possessed favorable ones. 34
succinctly but effectively some of the fundamental assimilationistversus-liberationist perspectives on same-sex marriage.
Though not completely agreeable with the institution of
marriage, Stoddard took the position “that every lesbian and gay
man should have the right to marry the same-sex partner of his
or her choice, and that the gay rights movement should
aggressively seek full legal recognition for same-sex marriages.” 35
He then underscored his strong belief through practical, political,
and philosophical explanations that all more-or-less illustrate
how marriage would uphold and integrate same-sex couples
within mainstream society. 36
But from the liberationist view, Ettelbrick articulated her
anti-marriage stance by criticizing the importance of “selfaffirmation” that many gay couples ideally seek through
marriage. 37 She understood the appeal: “After all, those who
marry can be instantaneously transformed from ‘outsiders’ to

Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,
OUT/LOOK , Fall 1989, at 8, 9, 14-17 ; Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People
Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK , Fall 1989, at 8, 8-13.
33 David W. Dunlap, Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Expert in Gay Rights Movement,
Dies
at
56,
N.Y.
Times
(Oct.
8,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/nyregion/paula-l-ettelbrick-legal-expertin-gay-rights-movement-dies-at-56.html.
34 Id.
35 Stoddard, supra n. ___, at 10.
36 Id.
37 Ettelbrick, supra n. ___, at 9.
32
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‘insiders,’ and we have a desperate need to become insiders.” 38
That desire might be tantalizing to sexual minorities for various
symbolic and dignifying reasons, but Ettelbrick argued that
obtaining marriage would, firstly, force assimilation upon sexual
minorities rather than liberate them, and, secondly, minimize the
plurality of queer identities that preclude justice for sexual
minorities. 39 Rather, Ettelbrick argued that “[j]ustice for gay
men and lesbians will only be achieved when we are accepted and
supported in this society despite our differences from the
dominant culture and the choices we make regarding our
relationships.” 40 Marriage would be antithetical to her view of
equality that did not emphasize “sameness” but rather stressed
acceptance and equal treatment of plurality. 41 “The law,” she
wrote, “provides us no room to argue that we are different, but
are nonetheless entitled to equal protection.” 42 Ultimately, in
marriage activism, Ettelbrick saw the rights-based approach by
assimilationists as resulting in inauthenticity: “We end up
mimicking all that is bad about an institution of marriage in our
effort to appear to be the same as straight couples.” 43 That
inauthenticity would accommodate the inequalities within gay
culture and society as well:
Of course, a white man who marries another white
man who has a full-time job with benefits will
certainly be able to share in those benefits and
overcome the only obstacle left to full societal
assimilation—the goal of many in his class. In other
words, gay marriage will not topple the system that
allows only the privileged few to obtain decent
health care. Nor will it close the privilege gap
between those who are married and those who are
not. 44

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 10, 14.
at 14.
at 15.
at 16.
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Prophetically, Ettelbrick also predicted the decline in gay political
advancement once marriage is obtained: “If the laws change
tomorrow and lesbians and gay men were allowed to marry,
where would we find the incentive to continue the progressive
movement we have started that is pushing for societal and legal
recognition of all kinds of family relationships?” 45 All in all, her
reasons against pursuing marriage were predominantly pointed
at how it would subordinate sexual minorities underneath a
multidimensional, white heteronormative supremacy both
externally and within the movement.
In pre-Obergefell 1989, the Stoddard-Ettelbrick pro-andcon debate in Out/Look Magazine illuminated profound
complications that the idea of marriage underscored between
assimilationist and liberationist strategies for the movement as a
whole. But in light of any efforts to resist conformity and
assimilation, marriage equality activism began to advance shortly
around the time the Stoddard-Ettelbrick debate was published. 46
Despite latency for more than a decade, interest in advancing
same-sex marriage came about consequentially from the impact
that the AIDS epidemic pressed upon inheritance and death
benefits issues of sexual minorities. 47 In 1989, the State Bar
Association of California recommended legally recognizing samesex marriages. 48 Then in the early 1990s, marriage litigation
that began in Hawaii eventually led to the temporary success of
Baehr v. Lewin, 49 where the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized
that denying same-sex couples the right to marry could be
unconstitutional. 50 The surprise success of Baehr, however slight,
brought frenzy to both social conservatives and gay rights
proponents. 51 According to Carlos Ball, post-Baehr “a growing
number of LGBT rights organizations, facing both the surprising
Id. at 17.
See, e.g., Philip S. Gutis, Ideas and Trends: Small Steps Toward Acceptance
Renew Debate on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES ARCHIVES (Nov. 5, 1989),
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/05/weekinreview/ideas-trends-small-stepstoward-acceptance-renew-debate-on-gay-marriage.html.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
50 Id. at 68.
51 Ball, supra n. __, at 3.
45
46
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prospect of a possible victory in the Hawai’i courts and a growing
conservative backlash against marital rights for same-sex
couples, quickly turned the pursuit of marriage equality into their
most important objective.” 52
Though the marriage equality movement held possibilities
for articulating gay rights through a more universalized frame 53
and its focus on same-sex couples pushed the discussion over
sexual orientation discrimination into a different realm, 54 a
substantial formulation for demanding equality in marriage
hinged on assimilationist arguments based on sameness:
Through the process of demanding admission into
the institution of marriage, the movement sought to
establish that LGBT individuals were capable of
entering
and
remaining
in
committed
relationships—and, for those who had them, of
raising children—in ways that did not differ
fundamentally
from
the
experiences
of
55
heterosexuals.
Such sameness arguments eventually prevailed to facilitate
certain sub-group’s desires for disparate results for other subgroups in the LGBTQ movement:
Although some feminist and queer activists
continued to criticize the embrace of marriage as an
assimilationist and conservative move that would
not help individuals who were not interested in, or
would not benefit financially from, marriage, those
voices were largely drowned out as many movement
organizations, as well as an apparent majority of
LGBT individuals, made marriage equality their top
political priority.” 56

Id.
Janet R. Jakobsen, Queer Relations: A Reading of Martha Nussbaum on
Same-Sex Marriage, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 133, 137 (2010).
54 Ball, supra n. __, at 3.
55 Id.
56 Id.
52
53
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As Ettelbrick predicted, the drive toward marriage equality was
eventually fueled by a prevalent class within the LGBTQ
movement at the cost of intra-group marginalization.
C. ASSIMILATIONIST STRATEGIES AND I NTEREST CONVERGENCE
While Obergefell was being heard at the Supreme Court—
just a little more than two decades after Baehr—the effects of
assimilationist strategies in the marriage equality and gay rights
movements had continued to crystallize. Ettelbrick’s noted
disparity had, indeed, persisted.
Mere months before the
Obergefell decision, Alexander Nourafshan and Angela OnwuachiWillig echoed what other scholars had articulated—that successes
in gay rights advancement in pursuing marriage had incurred an
unfortunate cost to the movement itself. 57
According to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, in
championing marriage, movement proponents had, historically
throughout the
struggle up to Obergefell, embraced
assimilationist tactics over liberationist ones: “[R]ather than seek
to disrupt the paradigm of heteronormativity, assimilationoriented homosexuals sought to fit gay rights into the existing
legal and social structure, without threatening to upend the social
order.” 58 The consequences might have made some in-roads
toward formal equality, but the progress retained—if not
deepened—some substantial limits for the movement as a whole:
Although Windsor and the revolution of cases that
have led to Obergefell [sic] hold significant promise
for one privileged subset of gays and lesbians—
white, economically privileged, and educated gays
and lesbians—they do not necessarily carry the same
potential for less privileged subgroups within the
gay and lesbian community, namely gays and
lesbians of color. 59
Alexander Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider
and Outsider Again: Interest Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT
Identity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521 (2015).
58 Id. at 526 (citations omitted).
59 Id. at 521-22.
57
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Others have similarly discerned, before and since Obergefell, that
the assimilative push for equality in marriage was ironically done
through channeling some important disparities within the gay
community and movement. According to Kathrine Franke, “[i]n
the marriage cases, lesbians and gay men have accomplished a
rebranding of what it means to be homosexual.” 60 Through what
she calls “just like us” arguments that connote sameness to the
mainstream, 61 that sameness connotation has eventually led to
the prevailing use of whiteness in marriage litigation’s
rebranding of the gay identity. 62 Consequently, she posits that
marriage became “publicly perceived to be a white issue” and the
marriage equality movement itself “specifically enjoy a kind of
racial privilege that has underwritten the plausibility of this
positive transformation in the meaning of gay identity.” 63 Even
before the 2003 success in Massachusetts through Goodridge,
Darren Lenard Hutchinson had referenced what some scholars on
race were already saying about the same-sex marriage movement
in the U.S.—the apprehension “that many (or most) of the
benefits from same-sex marriage will accrue to white and upperclass individuals.” 64
Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig also contend that the
assimilationist strategies in marriage equality became a vehicle
for a dominant sexual minority group—one that projected a
white, upper-middle class image to emerge with its interests
(including marriage) as representative of the rest of the sexual
minority population. 65 They direct their findings at the sameness
arguments. 66 Although the movement obtained some progress on
social issues such as marriage, the collateral result is that “[t]he
movement’s portrayal of gay identity as white, wealthy, and
educated has created a race-based insider identity for white
Katherine Franke, What Marriage Equality Teaches Us: The Afterlife of
Racism and Homophobia, in Ball, supra n. __, at 247.
61 Id. at 249-50.
62 Id. at 250.
63 Id. at 251.
64 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites" ?: Race, Sexual
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1370
(2000)
65 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522.
66 Id. at 526.
60
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homosexuals in mainstream society and within the gay
community.” 67 In other words, “[t]he construction of gay identity
has rendered whiteness the racial default, implicitly privileging
white homosexuals over gays of color.” 68 Rebranding has become
reality.
The saliency of this result is itself not hard to perceive.
Indeed, even in 1989 before the advancement of marriage
equality, Ettelbrick had predicted the racial and economic
subordination of sexual minorities through obtaining the right to
marry. Borrowing from Derrick Bell’s racial justice theorizing,
his interest convergence theory helps illuminate the correlation
between assimilationist strategies in the marriage movement and
marginalizing effects on sexual minorities. 69 In theorizing racial
inequality, Bell posited that the recognition of legal rights of
those subordinated only occur upon convincing the white
decisionmakers that the interests of both groups converge. 70 At
the start of the marriage movement, sexual minorities vying for
the right to marry appeared as outsiders attempting to appease
the heterosexual mainstream who have the ability to marry and
the power to extend the right to marry. Proponents and
movement activists abandoned liberationist, outsider rhetoric to
reach for sameness arguments, which revised pronouncements
that same-sex couples could love, have relationships, or rear
children well enough to deserve the rights and benefits of
marriage to be “just like you.” Assimilationist accounts of
sameness were predicated on how identical same-sex couples
were to the heterosexual couples—how they would be unlikely to
threaten the status quo. Once the establishment was convinced
of the sameness, sexual minorities were granted the right to
marry. In this way, making marriage equality appear as a “white
issue” facilitated sameness arguments and also aligned the
interests of between sexual minorities and the power-granting
establishment. As Franke notes, “[t]he racial endowment as
Id. at 534.
Id.
69 See Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions of
LGBT Privilege and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 31 Law & Ineq.
117, 137-53 (2012).
70 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
67
68
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white from which the marriage equality movement has benefited .
. . surely helped conservative courts, legislators, and others come
to see an affinity of interest with this cause.” 71 This notion is so
“even if not grounded in reality, since many of the members of the
LGBT community who sought marriage rights were people of
color.” 72
In propelling gay rights and legal protections, this strategy
to align interests is not exclusive to the marriage issue. Anthony
Michael Kreis has drawn several accounts that reveal the impact
of interest convergence in recent gay rights advances. 73 Reading
together Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer v. Evans 74 and Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 75 Kreis argues
that the Supreme Court’s reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick 76
involved several layers of interest convergence. With Romer,
Kreis has discerned that Scalia’s scathing dissent was a reaction
to the undercurrent of white privilege that helped convince the
majority of Amendment 2’s animus: “[Scalia’s] intent was surely
to highlight that the LGBT community is a powerful and visible
force within the legal community and that visibility makes it
easier for his fellow Justices to grant rights to a group of people
with whom lawyers typically associate.” 77 Sameness facilitated
Romer’s outcome. Kreis then pairs the resonance of Scalia’s
Romer dissent with the passage in Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Lawrence, when sameness was used to connote the discriminatory
effect of sodomy laws. 78 As Kennedy distinguished the facts of
the case from a case that might have involved minors,
nonconsensual sex, public indecency, prostitution, or legal
recognition of same-sex relationships, he stated that Lawrence, on
the contrary, “involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.” 79 As such, “[t]he petitioners are entitled to
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Franke, supra n. __, at 250.
Id.
See generally Kreis, supra n. __.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Kreis, supra n. __, at 148.
Id. at 149.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Kreis, supra n.__, at 149.
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respect for their private lives.” 80 Kennedy imbued the petitioners
with sameness rhetoric by drawing them in broad enough terms—
“two adults” 81 who were consensually “engaged in sexual
practices” 82—but at the same time juxtaposing their case and
predicament away from situations of real vice—pedophilia, rape,
indecency, or prostitution—or a situation of larger societal or
normalizing scope—perhaps same-sex marriage. The petitioners
were just having consensual sex. What’s the harm in that? At
the same time, Kennedy seems to show how the petititoners’
interests aligned with the decision-making establishment
because, according to Kreis, the passage “emphasizes that there is
no harm to heteronormative norms with the majority’s
decision.” 83 Furthermore, by the time Lawrence weighed the
legality of same-sex intimacy, other heteronormative institutions
that might have been once threatened by the overturning of
Bowers—such as religious organizations—already had such
threats “neutralized” in other Supreme Court decisions. 84 Such
neutralization of threats that Lawrence might have posed further
demonstrated the aligning of interests that helped reverse
Bowers: “The Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence opinions are strong
evidence that once shared identity interests are realized, judicial
remedies favoring sexual minorities will be authorized provided
they do not undermine the power or authority of peer
heterosexual stakeholders.” 85
In other words, the legal
protections sexual minorities were asking for can be granted so
long as such protections would not threaten the heteronormative
status quo.
Similarly, Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig illustrate one
particularly glaring instance of interest convergence in U.S. v.
Windsor 86:

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also Kreis, supra n.__, at 149.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
82 Id.
83 Kreis, supra n.__, at 149.
84 Id. at150.
85 Id. at151.
86 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522-23; 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
80
81
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Under the theory of interest convergence, Edith
Windsor, a wealthy, white woman in a long-term
committed relationship in New York City, was, in
many ways, the perfect plaintiff to challenge DOMA
because she could be sold as part of a respectable,
assimilation-based gay image to the general public
and, more importantly, to those in power. 87
Particular aspects of Windsor’s marriage to her deceased spouse
Thea Spyer seemed conducive for drawing sameness arguments.
According to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, Windsor’s
“wedding was ‘mainstream’ enough to be featured in the New
York Times wedding section, even though the state of New York
did not recognize same-sex marriage until 2012.” 88 In addition,
“[b]oth Windsor, who holds a Master’s degree from N.Y.U., and
Spyer, who has a Ph.D., have elite pedigrees in terms of
education.” 89 The combination of these attributes made the
conclusion viable that “Edie Windsor closely hues to the image of
homosexuality that has been consciously crafted in the public
sphere.” 90
Beyond the ways her identity could be construed as
“conforming to society’s perceived normative ideal in all ways
expect for sexuality,” 91 the financial losses associated with how
the Defense of Marriage Act discriminated against her staterecognized marriage on the federal level (charging her $363,053
in estate taxes) made her “sympathetic.” 92 In deconstructing the
image that Windsor presented, Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig
tease out the converging interests. Windsor’s estate taxes dispute
could be “highly salient to white elites, both gay and non-gay
alike.” 93
Her “respectability-based identity as a lesbian
represented a departure from the stereotype of hyper-sexuality
that is often affiliated with or imputed to gay culture.” 94
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522.
Id. at 522 n. 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Windsor’s “racial identity as a white woman reified the primacy of
whiteness in the gay community and gay rights movement.” 95
Not to mention, “her identity as an educated Northerner
reinforced notions of sophistication and assimilation in the gay
and lesbian community.” 96 Combined together, these attributes
“helped to remove the stigma of otherness (to an extent) and thus
enabled broad swaths of people to identify with her.” 97 Of course,
according to Nourafshan and Onwuachi-Willig, aligning interests
between Windsor and the establishment here also created the
inverse problem—using her attributes to draw similarities in
interest “also implicitly worked to mark those who did not fit this
normative ideal as outsiders.” 98
D. THE OBERGEFELL COUPLES
In examining Obergefell plaintiffs, Cynthia Godsoe has
noted that attorneys’ strategies in managing their plaintiffs’
“ordinariness” and “approachability” hinged on portraying a sense
of normality. 99 Animating both the selection of the twenty-nine
Obergefell plaintiffs and their performance of attributes, the
strategy of being normal was targeted chiefly toward members of
the Court in ways that maximized and ensured sufficient interest
convergence that would render positive outcomes:
[T]he Supreme Court is mainstream in its own way,
composed of nine individuals from a very narrow
slice of the population. Skilled advocates “play by its
rules, and tell the Justices stories they like to hear
about people who remind them of themselves.” In
other words, plaintiffs should assimilate to norms
that the Justices understand and their lawyers
should play down differences. 100
Id.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 136.
100 Id. at 136-40 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dahlai Lithwick, Extreme
Makeover: The Story Behind the Story of Lawrence v. Texas, N EW YORKER
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/03/12/extrememakeover-dahlia-lithwick) (emphasis added).
95
96
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In doing so, Godsoe observes that result of such elaborate
perception-building “reveals some deep-rooted assumptions about
what a family should look like and what is an appropriate path to
social change.” 101 Assimilationist strategies would likely fit that
path. According to Godsoe’s research, the Obergefell plaintiffs
were “largely homogenous and non-representative of LGB
families,” 102 and their similarities and attributes can be
categorized and compiled into to an archetypal scheme. Though
self-identified as sexual minorities, the Obergefell plaintiffs
appear to Godsoe to share four common traits; they are (1)
typically all-American, (2) asexual, (3) devoted to childrearing
and/or caregiving, and (4) accidentally political. 103
What Godsoe describes as “all-American” is synonymous
with “reflect[ing] a traditional ‘Leave it to Beaver’ American
ideal” 104 typified by their “overwhelmingly white and middle or
upper-middle class” 105 composition that is “starkly different than
the gay and lesbian population.” 106 In fact, only five Obergefell
plaintiffs are white, and out of sixteen couples, just three are
racially mixed. 107 These ratios amongst the Obergefell plaintiffs
here are incongruous and unrepresentative of the racial
breakdown in LGBT population as Godsoe reports. 108
Moreover, to continue building their all-American features,
Godsoe notes that they “all have eminently respectable jobs.” 109
She illuminates this all-Americanness using one particular
example of an actual Obergefell plaintiff-couple: “[T]wo attractive
veterinary professors who were recruited because they are ‘in a
stable, good relationship,’ and are ‘likeable’ ‘homeowners’ with
respectable jobs.” 110 In other words, using Godsoe’s own synonym
for all-American, the Obergefell plaintiffs are more or less
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 140.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 139.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 138.
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“mainstream.” 111 Extrapolating from Godsoe’s research, this
group of litigants exhibited fewer or nearly no features that would
personify them readily as “queer”; they do not appear to embody
particularized attributes normally associated with sexual
minority life, status, or culture. There are no transpeople or HIVpositive individuals amongst these plaintiffs. 112 Nor did these
litigants
possess
less-seemingly
“respectable”
jobs,
characteristics, or backgrounds that would label them alternative
from the mainstream in some way. 113 They are overwhelmingly
white and privileged, and present themselves and their families
as “ ‘do[ing] exactly the same things as everyone else does,’ ” 114 or
they consider themselves “ ‘just as boring and crazy and loud as
any other family.’ ” 115 In essence, one can alternatively designate
what Godsoe identifies as “all-American” or “mainstream” in the
Obergefell plaintiffs as assimilated characteristics.
Likewise, Godsoe noted that Obergefell plaintiffs were
“asexual” or de-sexualized 116—meaning that their highly-crafted
image avoided the stereotypical notions of gay promiscuity or
even reminded the public or the Court of non-heteronormative
sex: “Not one of the many photographs and videos available
online depict a plaintiff kissing his or her partner. Sex is never
mentioned.” 117
Rather their “asexual” images portray
monogamous couples committed in their relationships to oneanother. 118 To borrow from Kreis’ observations regarding interest
convergence from Lawrence, 119 the de-sexualization of plaintiffs
here likely serves to signal and underscore their non-threatening
nature—how the qualities of their same-sex relationships (which
would include aspects of sex and sexual intimacy) would not
threaten the establishment’s social order. The irony here is that
the Obergefell attorneys’ needed to de-sexualize their plaintiffs
before the public and the Justices despite the progress already
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 145.
Id.
Id. (noting no plaintiff with criminal histories or tattoos).
Id. 147
Id.
Id. at 147-48.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Kreis, supra n. __, at 149.
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made by the Court in Lawrence to decriminalize consensual samesex intimacy—in other words, despite the Court having
neutralized that threat. 120 Thus, the tactic to de-sexualize the
Obergefell plaintiffs here seem overprotective, and overstates the
notion in Lawrence that consensual same-sex sexual activity bore
no harm to the establishment; the truth about the sex in
controversy in Lawrence was that it was unlikely to have met
traditionally nuclear and heteronormative standards as the
Lawrence litigants involved were likely not a committed couple. 121
In Obergefell, the plaintiffs’ could not threaten the status quo
because they appeared so asexual or sterile that sex was
categorically avoided. Simultaneously, the move also appears
regressive as if intended to avoid the connotations that sodomy in
Bowers had engendered 122 or perhaps reach back further to early
same-sex marriage cases when the primacy of procreative sex
quashed any advancement of granting same-sex couples the right
to marry. 123 All in all, the prophylactic move to de-sexualize
Obergefell plaintiffs seemed aimed to neutralize any indication of
threat to the mainstream social order.
According to Godsoe, the Obergefell plaintiffs were also
engaged in childrearing at a degree much higher than statistics
for the sexual minority population, or, if they did not have
children, was often engaged in caretaking responsibilities for
either their partners or parents. 124
Godsoe observed that
caregiving “not only further desexualizes LGB relationship, but
also entrenches the privatization of dependency, exempting the
state from responsibility for supporting the disabled and
children.” 125 But not only does caregiving facilitates the “reward”
for receiving legal recognition of marriage, as Godsoe describes, 126
the use of childrearing and caregiving also aligns the interests of
sexual minorities with the establishment by again minimizing
same-sex relationships as non-threatening and appearing to hold
539 U.S. at 566-79.
Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1464, 1478 (2004).
122 Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
123 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
124 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 149.
125 Id. at 150.
126 Id.
120
121
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up the values of childrearing and family subscribed by the
mainstream—suggesting hints of assimilation in this attribute as
well. One is reminded by the quote from House of Cards:
“Everyone can get behind children.” 127 This suggestion remains
even if the Obergefell plaintiffs overstate the prevalence of
childrearing amongst the sexual minority population. 128
Finally, Godsoe perceives Obergefell plaintiffs as political
outsiders, calling them “Accidental Activists.” 129 Indeed, “[t]he
final ingredient in the perfect plaintiff [in Obergefell] is a disdain
for politics. The Obergefell plaintiffs have been cast as ‘ordinary’
folks who just happened to get involved[.]” 130 They claim not to
be “activists” but just interested in their private existence. 131 Yet,
their apolitical nature seems disingenuous to Godsoe, who notes
their public involvement with the press, appearances at advocacy
events, contributions to the media, and attendance at Supreme
Court arguments once they were selected as plaintiffs. 132 Again,
the “apolitical” narratives seem to lessen any “activist”
connotations, perhaps adding to their non-threatening personas.
All in all, Godsoe’s intricate scholarship here on the
Obergefell plaintiffs details motivated interest convergence that
underscores the reason why attorneys opted for an assimilationist
strategy—one that complements and proves on a litigative scale
Katherine Franke’s remark about the collateral rebranding of the
gay identity by the movement’s focus on obtaining marriage
equality. 133 Franke’s observations about racial marginalization in
the marriage litigation also match Godsoe’s on Obergefell: “When
the lawyers and the clients in the gay marriage cases stand on
the steps of the Supreme Court after arguing their case for
marriage equality, all, or nearly all, of them are white.” 134 Major
coverage of recent marriage cases feature white individuals as
plaintiffs and attorneys; noted leaders at major gay organizations
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

House of Cards: Chapter 1 (Netflix Feb. 1, 2013).
Godsoe, supra n. __, at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 151-52 (“They protest too much.”)
Franke, supra n. __, at 247.
Id. at 251.
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involved in marriage equality advances have also been white. 135
But despite the images of incongruity between the sexual
minorities at the frontlines of the marriage equality movement
and those residing within the sexual minority population as a
whole, the assimilationist strategy and the interest convergence
ultimately worked to convince the Court to give same-sex couples
the right to marry in Obergefell. 136 Identifying marriage as the
“keystone of our social order,” Kennedy ultimately extended such
right to plaintiff same-sex couples. 137
E. HIERARCHICAL EFFECTS
If Franke and others are correct that the assimilationist
strategy in advancing toward marriage equality succeeded in
rebranding the perception of the gay identity as predominately
white, upper-middle class, then this result leaves out a
substantial reality about the sexual minority population as a
whole. Amongst the LGBTQ population, racial and economic
stratification mirrors that of the general population in the U.S. 138
For better or worse, with marriage having arisen as the top
priority of the gay rights movement in the last two decades, a
skewed representation of the gay identity has emerged to help
obtain formal equality at the expense of underprivileged voices in
the sexual minority population. The problem is multifold. First,
such success in formal equality using assimilationist strategies
has, in essence, led to the replication of racial and
underprivileged subordination within the architecture of such
formal equality established in cases such as Windsor and
Obergefell. On the one hand, the sameness arguments and
interest convergence have only gotten the movement so far. In
Windsor, Kennedy essentially replicated and extended his use of
rationality with bite from Romer. 139 While in Obergefell, he
Id.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601-02 (2015).
137 Id. at 2601.
138 See, e.g., Gary J. Gates, Williams Inst., LGBT Demographics: Comparisons
Among
Population-Based
Surveys
(2014),
http://
williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/lgbt-dem ogs-sep-2014. pdf.
139 See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 81 BROOK . L. REV. 1015, 1048 (2016).
135
136
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extended the right to marry primarily based on 14th amendment
due process considerations—reflective of a similar stroke he used
in Lawrence—and left a very thin equality jurisprudence hinged
again on due process considerations, not on any heightened
scrutiny analysis. 140 As Kreis remarked about lower district and
appellate court marriage decisions that rendered favorably for
same-sex couples, “[f]rom a judge’s perspective, it might very well
be considerably difficult to apply a more exacting level of judicial
review to a class of people that appear privileged.” 141 In that way,
the sameness arguments have a plateauing limit based on Bell’s
interest convergence thesis: “So long as the interests of judges
and White elites remain converged with the interest of the LGBT
community due to a perceived common intersection of identity,
and so long as remedies for LGBT discrimination do not
undermine heteronormative interests, LGBT rights will
ultimately prevail.” 142
Examined this way, the contours of
formal equality from recent advancement in gay rights are
problematic. The encasement of hierarchy and privilege within
advances for formal equality for sexual minorities makes such
formal equality, once obtained, less than ideal—somewhat
pernicious even—as a form of equality. Of course, same-sex
couples do receive benefits through marriage. But because
marriage was achieved through assimilationist strategies that
aligned interests between privileged sexual minorities and the
establishment, such achievements carry with them a certain level
of taint.
Internally amongst sexual minorities, assimilationist
strategies that accomplished, in part, the rebranding of the gay
identity for the mainstream have also committed erasure for nonwhite, intersectional sexual minorities.
For instance, as
Nourafshan and Onuachi-Willig noted, the assimilationist,
sameness strategies used in Windsor “enabled broad swaths of
people to identify with [Edith Windsor]” but “also implicitly
worked to mark those who did not fit this normative ideal as
outsiders.” 143 As Stewart Chang has remarked, “[w]hen formal
140
141
142
143

See 135 S. Ct. at 2603-05.
Kreis, supra n. __, at 160.
Id. at 161.
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equality is tied to marriage, only those who subscribe to and have
access to the institution of marriage are able to attain
equality.” 144 Thus, marriage equality furthers sexual minority
subordination by “stifl[ing] heterogeneous sexualities.” 145 All of
this effectively stretches the existing marginalization of
underprivileged and/or racial sexual minorities who do not fit the
model created by assimilationist strategies.
Going forth, assimilationist strategies here will prove to be
an obstacle in future advances for true equality. First, according
to Kreis’ take on Bell’s interest convergence, gay rights will only
prevail so long as interests are aligned and reparations for
discrimination do not disturb the status quo. 146 Because the
interests of sexual minorities who do not appear assimilated do
challenge establishment norms—whether racially, economically,
or otherwise—further advances in the areas of employment and
housing discrimination, where intersectional members are
affected more often, will likely face stagnancy. Such a result
means that the progress for advancing sexual minorities has
stalled since Obergefell and will likely taper unless a
transformative strategy intervenes. As Part III will show, that
stagnancy is apparent in aspects of the Masterpiece decision.
III. UNALIGNED I NTERESTS IN MASTERPIECE
The Masterpiece dispute originated in 2012 when Charlie
Craig and David Mullins, a Colorado same-sex couple, tried to
order a custom-made wedding cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop
and its owner-baker, Jack Phillips. 147 Because Colorado did not
recognize same-sex marriages at the time, Craig and Mullins had
planned to marry lawfully in Massachusetts and then return to
Colorado to celebrate their out-of-state marriage. 148 A customordered wedding cake from Phillip’s shop would have been part of
that celebration. 149 Upon hearing that Craig and Mullins wanted
Stewart Chang, Is Gay the New Asian?: Marriage Equality and the Dawn of
a New Model Minority, 23 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 26-27 (2016).
145 Id. at 27.
146 Kreis, supra n. __, at 161.
147 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
148 Id.
149 Id.
144
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a custom wedding cake for their party, Phillips refused, and later
claimed that baking and selling a cake that celebrated a same-sex
wedding was contrary to his Christian beliefs. 150 Craig and
Mullins subsequently complained against Phillips and his bakery
to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, alleging sexual
orientation discrimination under the public accommodations
section of Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”). 151 The
couple’s claim succeeded before the Commission and Phillips
appealed. 152
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission’s findings that Phillips had discriminated against
Craig and Mullins. 153 Yet in its 2017-2018 term, the Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, ruling that the
Commission and the appeals court did not exercise religious
neutrality when examining the baker’s actions. 154 The finding of
religious hostility allowed the Court to pass on deciding whether
substantively CADA ought to prevail in favor of Craig and
Mullins or whether Phillips’ speech and religious exercise rights
under the First Amendment were violated. 155 The Court, instead,
turned to criticizing the adjudicating processes below to reset the
postures of the case. 156
A. QUEERING THE RESPONDENTS
In contrast to the assimilated and mainstream identities
that the same-sex couples projected during the Obergefell
litigation, the same-sex couple in Masterpiece did not appear as
readily assimilated when they engaged in their legal battles over
an instance of alleged sexual orientation discrimination.
Although Craig and Mullins are both racially white and male,
they did not share many of the other “normalized” similarities
with the Obergefell plaintiffs. Substantially missing from Craig
and Mullins’ public personas were characteristics that would have
easily fallen within any of Godsoe’s four archetypal traits of gay
assimilation in Obergefell: (1) projections of all-Americanness; (2)
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
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asexuality; (3) childrearing or caretaking obligations; and (4)
accidental activism. 157 If Godsoe’s four categories are to be taken
at some value for what it means to be gay and assimilated—at
least in the Obergefell universe—then under a similar analysis,
Craig and Mullins would stand outside the contours of
assimilation.
1. Not Mainstream All-American
First, the couple here appears less mainstream or “allAmerican” than the Obergefell plaintiffs. Neither of them have
jobs or careers that would survive a judgmental, status-driven
scrutiny; neither of them have careers comparable to those held
by the Obergefell plaintiffs that Godsoe had termed “eminently
respectable.” 158 During the case, only one of the two, Mullins, had
professional employment, but only as an office manager at a real
estate firm. 159 Craig, meanwhile, was not employed despite his
interior design training; during the years of litigation he had
stalled in launching his career. 160 Also, to further deviate from
perceived respectability, Mullins, aside from his day-job as an
office manager, admitted to harboring literary ambitions as a
poet. 161 The couple neither embodied the more stable, uppermiddle class professional template that Godsoe had identified
with the Obergefell plaintiffs or, to extend comparisons further
back to Windsor, possessed the wealth or elite educations that
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer had. 162 Of course, Craig and
Mullins could be millionaires in private. But on the surface, their
professional and class identities vastly deviated from the upper
middle-class image of prior marriage equality plaintiffs.

See Godsoe, supra n. __, at 145-52.
Id. at 146
159 Allison Sherry, After the Masterpiece Ruling, David Mullins and Charlie
Craig Hope to Move On, COLO . PUB. RADIO N EWS (Jun. 11, 2018),
http://www.cpr.org/news/story/after-the-masterpiece-ruling-david-mullins-andcharlie-craig-hope-to-move-on [hereinafter Sherry, After the Masterpiece
Ruling].
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Nourafshan & Onwuachi-Willig, supra n. __, at 522 n. 7.
157
158
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Culturally, Craig and Mullins also did not embody “allAmerican” identities, nor project themselves as “Leave It to
Beaver”-types either—borrowing Godsoe’s phraseology. Neither
seemed to have served in the military and thus would lack the
easy connotation that service could graft to create a conventional
sense of patriotism. 163
Additionally, in their physical
appearances, Craig and Mullins did not exhibit the “gendered”
norms of hetero-masculinity typical of a “Leave It to Beaver,”
traditionally all-American world. Various media photographs of
the couple during their litigation depicted them adhering less to a
“straightacting,” hetero-masculine script. Indeed, they often
played with gender expectations with their physical choices in
clothing, hairstyle, and jewelry. For instance, on the day of the
Supreme Court arguments, both Mullins and Craig stood outside
the Supreme Court Building in suits and ties. 164 However,
deviating from traditional dark suits and conservative shirt-andtie combinations, Mullins wore a brighter navy blue suit with his
shirt and patterned tie both in dark purple, while Craig wore an
all purple ensemble except for his bright white tie that stood out
vividly along with his stylized hair dyed in platinum lavender. 165
The couple matched themselves more than their attorneys, and
would have been easily noticed—deliberately so. By stark
contrast, at Obergefell oral arguments, Jim Obergefell wore a
traditional black suit paired with a lighted-colored checkered
shirt and tie that was trendy but more conventional. 166 Beyond
judicial appearances, the Masterpiece couple’s other public image
Godsoe, supra n. __, at 146.
See, e.g., Lucia Graves, ‘This Happens All the Time’: Why A Gay Couple
Took Their Cake Case to the Supreme Court, The Guardian (Jan. 18, 2018)
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/18/colorado-cake-shop-casesupreme-court (showing photograph of the Masterpiece couple at the Supreme
Court Building).
165 Id.; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Justices Ginsburg and Kagan Ask About the
YORKER
(Dec.
5,
2017),
Artistry
of
Wedding
Cakes,
N EW
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/justices-ginsburg-and-kaganask-about-the-artistry-of-wedding-cakes (showing the couple in full).
166 E.g., Michael S. Rosewald, A Day in Court for Jim Obergefell, the Face of the
POST
(Apr.
25,
2015),
Historic
Gay
Marriage
Case,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-day-in-court-for-jim-obergefell-theface-of-the-historic-gay-marriage-case/2015/04/28/99a00bdc-eda5-11e4-8666a1d756d0218e_story.html?utm_term=.4b329ca92a85
(photograph
of
Jim
Obergefell at Supreme Court Building on argument day).
163
164
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choices in the media also exhibited their play with traditional
masculine expectations. Often the couple was photographed
wearing flashy, ostentatious clothing and alternative jewelry. 167
Instead of keeping a stable sense of physical appearance, they
varied their hair and grooming—especially Mullins who appear
from one photographical moment to the next altering his hair
colors and lengths, maintaining what some might deem a more
“androgynous” look. 168 Meanwhile, Craig often sported a sharplytrimmed beard and would seem to be the less androgynous of the
two, but he also changed his hair color from time to time as
well. 169 Compared to traditional, unwavering notions of allAmerican male-ness, frequent variations in appearances would
connote destabilizing “gendered” characteristics and even
personality traits of instability. In contrast to the Obergefell
plaintiffs, Craig and Mullins projected an image that suggested
they were not doing “exactly the same things as everyone else
does.” 170 Stereotypically, they seemed more diverse, and less
“family-oriented.” In other words, they appeared “alternative,”
rather than “normal” or “mainstream”—even “queer” rather than
“gay,” against the Obergefell template.
2. Not Asexual

See, e.g., David Crary, Opponents in LGBT Case Agree: It's Not About
N EWS
(Dec.
1,
2017)
Wedding
Cake,
AP
https://www.apnews.com/b4ef2e38d9b141d2ad82df3229a15928
(photograph
of
couple); Allison Sherry, Colorado’s Masterpiece Cakeshop Case Winds Toward
A Decision With SCOTUS Arguments, COLO . PUB. RADIO N EWS (Dec. 3, 2017),
http://www.cpr.org/news/story/colorado-s-masterpiece-cakeshop-case-windstoward-a-decision-with-scotus-argum ents (photograph of couple).
168 Compare id., with Sandhya Somashekhar, Trial Begins in Colorado SamePOST
(July
5,
2017),
Sex
Marriage
Cake
Case,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/07/07/trial-beginsin-colorado-same-sex-m arriage-cake-case/?utm_term=.43b1c494cb5a.
169 E.g., Richard Wolf, Gay Couple, Devout Baker Take Cake Fight to High
TODAY
(Nov.
26,
2017),
Court,
U.S.A.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/11/26/gay-couple-devoutbaker-take-cake-fight-high-court/875305001/.
170 Lily Hiott-Millis, 6th Circuit Plaintiffs Stand Strong In Face of Loss in
TO
MARRY
(Nov.
6,
2014),
Court
Today,
FREEDOM
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/6th-circuit-plaintiffs-stand-strongin-face-of-loss-in-court-today.
167
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Secondly, unlike the Obergefell plaintiffs, Craig and
Mullins did not obscure or hide their sexuality. Many of the
couple’s public photos offered examples of them not shying away
from affectionate gestures that could remind the public of their
same-sex sexual desires or attractions.
Often they were
photographed in loving poses—ranging from holding hands 171 and
slight, suggestive embracing 172 all the way to mouth-to-mouth
kissing 173—even kissing on the Supreme Court Building steps. 174
Their photograph in an NBC news feature in December 2017
depicted them casually but affectionately huddled together in a
public setting—Mullins with his body and legs curled in a loose
but upright fetal position against Craig, who was closely flanked
and attentive to holding Mullins. 175 Noticeably, Craig’s right
hand was reaching over the bottom of Mullins’ thighs while his
left hand was draped over the space between his own open legs,
covering his genitals. 176
Another photograph with Politico
showing the couple kissing seemed to have been done with a bit of
provocative intent. 177 In addition to their visual displays of samesex affection, the couple also discussed their physical affections
publicly. In one interview, Mullins even recounted a personal
See, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court Questions Bias in 'Gay Wedding Cake' Case,
BBC News (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada42232162 (holding hands).
172 Zoë Henry, Why a Gay-Themed Wedding Cake (And What the Supreme
Court Says about It) Matters to Your Business, INC.COM (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.inc.com/zoe-henry/gay-wedding-cake-case-heads-to-supremecourt.html (embracing).
173 Josh Gerstein, Trump Administration Sides with Cake Baker in Gay
(Sept.
7,
2017),
Wedding
Legal
Fight,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/07/trump-administration-gay-rightssupreme-court-242460 (kissing).
174 Erin Scott/Zuma Press, Photograph, ALAMY N EWS (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.alamy.com/washington-district-of-columbia-usa-5th-dec-2017charlie-craig-l-and-david-mullins-kiss-outside-the-supreme-court-after-oralarguments-in-masterpiece-cakeshop-v-colorado-civil-rights-commission-thecourt-ruled-in-favor-of-the-baker-who-denied-custom-wedding-cake-work-forcraig-and-mullins-credit-erin-scottzuma-wirealamy-live-newsimage188455863.html (kissing on Supreme Court Building).
175 Julie Compton, Meet the Couple behind the Masterpiece Cakeshop Supreme
Court Case, NBC News (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbcout/meet-couple-behind-masterpiece-cakeshop-suprem e-court-case-n826976.
176 Id.
177 Gerstein, supra n. __.
171
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experience of gay public affection with a previous lover as both a
liberating life event and a moment of personal bravery and pride,
describing the gesture of intimate handholding in public as “the
most normal thing in the world” 178 and “the first moment in my
life where I presented myself as unabashedly gay in a public
space.” 179 In their NBC news interview, the couple revealed that
their decision to marry came during an intimate moment while
“[t]hey were cuddling on their couch.” 180 From that statement,
one could facetiously interpret that the whole entire case of
Masterpiece might not have resulted, but for this one moment of
intimacy.
Although public displays of affection between opposite-sex
couples are so frequent to render them commonplace, if one
situated Craig and Mullins’ affectionate gestures back into the
hands (and bodies) of a male same-sex couple, their gestures
could have appeared so unfamiliar or unnatural to some in the
mainstream that such displays seemed threatening on several
levels. First, Craig and Mullins’ public displays of affection could
seem antithetical to the image of the respectable gay couple that
has been built up, for instance, by the de-sexualized, assimilated
impressions left by the Obergefell plaintiffs. 181 Craig and Mullins’
public gestures risked reminding the world of their sexuality and
hinted at the consensual intimacy behind closed doors. In that
way, their public displays of affection would have violated the
tenets of gay respectability. According to Yuvraj Joshi, “Lesbians
and gays may produce performances of respectability as defensive
strategies against being sexualized. Respectability may be a
means of stopping their sexuality from becoming a barrier to
their success and happiness or a safe space away from the pain
and suffering of homophobia.” 182 In comparison to any notions
of assimilation, Craig and Mullins’ public displays of affection
Eric Shorey & David Reddish, David Mullins & Charlie Craig Stood against
the “Humiliation of Being Told We Don’t Serve Your Kind,” QUEERTY (Jun. 24,
2018),
https://www.queerty.com/david-mullins-charlie-craig-stood-humiliationtold-dont-serve-kind-20180624.
179 Id.
180 Compton, supra n. __.
181 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 147-48.
182 Yuvraj Joshi, Respectable Queerness, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415. 429
(2012) [Joshi, Respectable Queerness].
178
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could have been interpreted as flaunting—a heightened reaction
of threat even though Lawrence has legally sanctioned even the
most intimate forms of such acts between same-sex couples.
On another level, their affection also had the potential to
risk distinguishing their sex acts from those of opposite-sex
couples. The image of two men being affectionate with each other
rather than the image of a man and a woman doing the same
could have triggered responses that distinguished consensual
same-sex intimacy from consensual acts of opposite-sex intimacy;
one way to do so would be by focusing on the latter’s procreative
agency. 183 Such images could also distinguish by triggering
stereotypical connotations of promiscuity, deviancy, and disease
historically associated with negative, biased opinions of gay sex,
particularly of the kind that contributed to the political
marginalization of sexual minorities during the AIDS crisis. 184
As a male same-sex couple rather than an opposite-sex couple,
their abundant public images of affection could have alienated
them from “mainstream” individuals who typically regarded
same-sex affection as prurient, or just plain foreign. Such
imagery and affectionate public displays reinforced their
sexuality, enhanced the danger for social distinction, and even
perhaps provoked homophobic reactions. This affect would undo
the sameness arguments within gay assimilationist tactics and
engender a heteronormative disapproval.
3. Not Family-Oriented Caretakers
According to Godsoe, involvement in childrearing or family
caretaking was the third archetypal characteristic of gay
assimilation the Obergefell plaintiffs displayed. 185 By contrast, in
the public revelations about their lives, the Masterpiece plaintiffs
made no mentioning of childrearing or caretaking of a loved one—
neither of the two seemed to have any adopted or biological
children nor did they seem involved in caretaking of a family
member; instead Craig and Mullins projected the image of a
E.g., Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. at 541.
MARTHA N USSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION &
THE LAW 5-6 (2010).
185 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 149.
183
184
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young, mobile couple who traveled, attended media parties, and
were essentially carefree from familial responsibilities than the
same-sex couples in Obergefell. 186 Thus, they risked associating
themselves with the kind of domestic values and family image
that the Obergefell plaintiffs projected. 187 In Craig and Mullins’
case, non-existent attachment to a domestic, family-oriented
lifestyle left their lives up for alternative interpretations. In
contrast to the effect that caregiving had on further “desexualizing” the Obergefell plaintiffs and their relationships, the
lack of caregiving or childrearing here could have had the
opposite effect. It suggested that Craig and Mullins had less
domesticated lives and were more easily differentiated from
“respectable” or responsible gay couples who do have children and
do take care of sick dependents. They seemed more hedonistic
than the Obergefell plaintiffs—less selfless with their time and
resources than gay couples helping to rear society’s next
generation or caring for the elderly. Moreover, being childless
and independent disqualifies them from “the reward of
caregiving” that has accompanied marriage equality cases
previously. 188 This image had the slippery effect of making their
marriage seem less dignified and less worthy of recognition.
4. Not Accidental Activists
Lastly, although Craig and Mullins have claimed that they
were—as the Obergefell plaintiffs had been—“accidental
activists,” 189 they seemed inconsistent in during interviews about
just how “accidental” they were. First, they contradicted their
own claims that they had no prior interest in LGBTQ activism.
During interviews, they mentioned that they both “actually tried
to avoid politics when they decided to get married” 190 and they
“were never activists in the gay rights movement.” 191 That
seemed more true for Mullins, who claimed he “considered
himself apolitical until the day he and Craig were turned away at
VH-1, Red Carpet Fashion, Picture 21, VH-1.com (Jun. 21, 2018)
http://www.vh1.com/photos/0wr209/2018-trailblazer-honors-red-carpet.
187 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 149-50.
188 Id. at 150.
189 Id. at 150-52.
190 Sherry, After the Masterpiece Ruling, supra n. __.
191 Id.
186
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Masterpiece Cakeshop.” 192 But in another interview, Craig
revealed he did harbor some prior activist experiences: “Craig, an
alumnus of University of Wyoming in Laramie, said 15 years ago
he was a board member of a student LGBT group that sought to
raise awareness for the Matthew Shepard Foundation and HIV
testing.” 193 In fact, Craig seemed to harbor latent motives for
activism because early experiences of being ostracized for his
sexuality were “hardships” that eventually “pushed him to fight
for himself on the cake case.” 194 Secondly, the act of pursuing a
case of sexual orientation discrimination against Phillips and the
bakery intrinsically seemed like a deliberate gesture of activism.
After suffering from the humiliation of Phillips’ refusal, the
couple first took their story online to Facebook, “which quickly
went viral worldwide in a couple of days.” 195 Of course, the couple
could have decided to forget the incident with Phillips and
ordered their wedding cake from another bakery. Taking their
story to social media, instead, could have been read as attentionseeking. The Facebook posting led Mullins and Craig to the
discovery that Colorado public accommodations law afforded
them recourse. 196 They got their wedding cake from another
bakery. 197 And then Lambda Legal and the ACLU became
involved in their case. 198 According to Mullins, “[e]ventually,
someone at the ACLU found us and we spoke to them, and we
decided to move forward to the complaint. . . . They sort of helped
us file the paperwork a little bit, and then after that and much
discussion on their part, they decided to take up the case.” 199
During their Supreme Court litigation, the couple
participated very publicly. Until the decision was rendered, they
had given over three hundred interviews, including interviews
Id.
Chris Johnson, Meet the Gay Couple at the Center of Masterpiece Cakeshop
BLADE
(Nov.
21,
2017),
Case,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonblade.com/2017/11/21/meet-the-gay-couple-at-thecenter-of-the-masterpiece-cakeshop-case/.
194 Sherry, After the Masterpiece Ruling, supra n. __.
195 Johnson, supra n. __.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
192
193
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with major news outlets. 200 They were honored with the VH-1
Trailblazer Award for their “public fight against LGBTQ
discrimination.” 201 Unlike plaintiffs in prior gay rights cases,
such as Lawrence v. Texas, both Craig and Mullins appeared at
the oral arguments at the Supreme Court. 202
While in
Washington, D.C. to attend the arguments, they made speeches
at several rallies 203 and felt that “it’s important for people to see
us just for the fact of we’re standing up for ourselves.” 204 It was
by chance that Craig and Mullins had experienced discrimination
at the Masterpiece Cakeshop; they had not expected Phillips to
refuse them based on his religious beliefs. 205 Some of the facts of
the case had accidental elements. Yet, the couple’s subsequent
reactions—taking their story to social media and speaking to
major advocacy groups—suggested decisiveness in seeking action
and recourse. When pressed in one interview about the state of
the LGBTQ community beyond their own lawsuit, Mullins
remarked with a keen sense of political acumen:
The three changes I see happening that most inspire
me are the aggressive dismantling of the gender
binary, the embrace of intersectionality, and the
push to make sure that marginalized voices, the
voices of transgender individuals, of non-white
people, of women, are not silenced or filtered through
the experiences of their cisgender, white male
counterparts. 206
With less detail, but sharing a similar political tone, Craig
responded to the same question with his analysis about gay
visibility:

Id.; Sherry, After the Masterpiece Ruling, supra n. __; Compton, supra n. __.
Evan Real, Gay Couple Behind Supreme Court Wedding Cake Case to
Receive VH1 Trailblazer Honor, THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jun. 21, 2018),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/gay-couple-behind-supreme-courtwedding-cake-case-be-honored-at-vh1-trailblazers-2018-1122285.
202 Godsoe, supra n. __, at 152.
203 Johnson, supra n. __.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Shorey & Reddish, supra n. __.
200
201
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For a long time the concept of fitting in was really
important and for good reason. Now, that we are
becoming more accepted by the public in general, I
see more people embracing their individuality, and
showing that our differences are what make our
culture unique. Pride month gives the necessary
visibility to our shared humanity. 207
These seemingly-liberationist remarks reflected their admission
after the Supreme Court decision was rendered that “they are
lifetime activists now.” 208 At that point, they could not claim to
be reluctant or “accidental.” In the reverse, they created an
image of willingness to challenge an instance of sexual
orientation discrimination against them personally and pursue it
as part of a comprehensive political impetus for change. For
them, the personal had become political.
B. THREATENING THE STATUS QUO
It is difficult to envision sameness arguments when we
place Craig and Mullins’ destabilizing sexualities within the
context of queerness. The notion of “queerness” itself evades a
concrete and stable definition, 209 and it is indeed theoretically
less constant than the terms “gay and lesbian”—which in recent
decades, have taken on more mainstream adoptions. 210 Unlike
“gay and lesbian,” the terminology “queer” does not merely
describe sexual practices or demarcate certain traits, features, or
conventions of same-sex lifestyles or practices; instead, whatever
features that embodies “queerness” defy such identity-oriented
classifications and exist as a means for “a destabilization of
heterosexual hegemony.” 211 Applying queerness to Craig and
Id.
Sherry, After the Masterpiece Ruling, supra n. __.
209 Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral
and the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9
MARQ . INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 248 (2005).
210 Bijal Shah, Gay American "Deviance:" Using International Comparative
Analysis to Argue for A Free Speech and Establishment Clause Approach to
Furthering Gay Marriage in the United States, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 85 n. 3
(2008).
211 Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent
Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83, 87 (1994).
207
208
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Mullins’ public personas, this observation would affirm and
explain how their sexualities appeared more destabilizing than
the Obergefell plaintiffs for the Masterpiece Court. They lacked
the perceived socio-economic respectability of assimilated gay
Americans. They flaunted their sexuality in public. They played
with androgyny and avoided wearing conventional clothing to
court appearances. They were more deliberate as activists. They
dodged family-oriented responsibilities of childcare or caretaking.
In essence, they affirmatively challenged the assimilated image of
normalcy the Obergefell plaintiffs had embodied and curtailed
any sameness arguments to be made for successfully increasing
the levels of respectability and interest convergence. Craig and
Mullins did not “cover” their identities, but in fact they offered a
representation of sexual minorities with features that perhaps
distanced themselves too far away from mainstream dominant
culture itself and its “reverse cover” expectations of “stable” gay
and lesbian identities. 212 As perceived, they are “less gay,” but
could be quite “more queer.” Consequently, major aspects of their
public personas—their lifestyle, images, dress, personalities,
political motivations, perceived dissociation from family values,
occupations, and the like—destabilized both heteronormative
associations of sexuality and connotations from mainstream gay
assimilated culture as well. It is quite possible that disruption
could be taken as a threat to the heteronormative status quo.
Indeed, the sense of threat could have provoked the Court’s less
sympathetic reaction in Masterpiece.
The destabilizing extent and perceived threat to the status
quo engendered by Craig and Mullin’s queerness becomes more
evident when considered within Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Masterpiece. In both the state commission
and Court of Appeal reviews, the couple obtained successful
showings that Phillips’ refusal had amounted to sexual
orientation discrimination under CADA. 213 Nevertheless, without
appearing assimilated, Craig and Mullins were unable to avail
themselves to Kennedy’s dignity jurisprudence to the extent that
marriage equality plaintiffs in Obergefell and Windsor previously
had. In Obergefell, assimilation had played well into Kennedy’s
212
213

Yoshino, supra n. __.
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
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dignity jurisprudence and eventually allowed the Court to extend
marriage rights to same-sex couples. 214 However, the manner in
which Kennedy defined dignity in Obergefell revealed that he
subscribed to a version of dignity that mandated respectability
rather than a version premised on an individual’s inherent worth
and respect. 215 Within that paradigm, assimilated characteristics
that illustrated how same-sex couples were invariably similar to
opposite-sex couples permitted a comparison of respectability to
be drawn where same-sex couples could seem just as respectable
and as dignified as opposite-sex couples. 216 From there, same-sex
couples’ interest to have their relationships legally recognized as
marriages were heightened and aligned with the establishment’s
interest to preserve and protect the primacy of marriage. As
Kennedy wrote in Obergefell, plaintiffs there had sought the right
to marry, “not to denigrate marriage but rather to live their lives,
or honor their spouses’ memory, joined by its bond.” 217 In
addition, by referring to how past historical changes to marriage,
such as the abandonment of coverture, have “strengthened, not
weakened, the institution of marriage,” Kennedy suggested in
Obergefell that extending the right to marry to same-sex couples
would do the same. 218
Thus, by relying on features of
assimilation and respectability to sufficiently dignify same-sex
couples in Obergefell, the legal interests of the plaintiffs there
aligned with mainstream interests to preserve marriage’s
institutional and social primacy. In this way, Kennedy’s dignity
jurisprudence in Obergefell became a vehicle that facilitated the
interest convergence that eventually resulted in marriage
equality.
On the contrary, in Masterpiece, Craig and Mullins’ lack of
comparable assimilated traits offered fewer opportunities for
leveraging respectability within Kennedy’s dignity paradigm. In
terms of setting up the case inquiry that eventually revealed a
denial of interest convergence for the Masterpiece couple,
Kennedy begins at the outset of his decision by immediately
214
215
216
217
218

Chang, supra n. __, at 6.
Joshi, Respectable Dignity, supra n. __, at 119.
Chang, supra note __, at 6.
135 S. Ct. at 2595.
Id. at 2596.
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establishing unequal levels of regard for the two sides of the
litigation. Even before presenting the issues, Kennedy attempts
to insinuate that what Craig and Mullins had requested from
Phillips was somewhat illegitimate and as a result portrayed the
couple in an undignified light. Beyond reciting that Phillips had
denied Craig and Mullins’ request for a custom wedding cake
because of his religious views against same-sex marriages,
Kennedy noted separately that Colorado had not recognized
same-sex marriages at the time. 219 This observation takes
attention off Craig and Mullins’ sexual identities, which CADA
protects, and suggests illicit conduct that would invariably bolster
or support Phillips’ discriminatory refusal; after all, Craig and
Mullins had been legally married in Massachusetts and were not
officially seeking to be recognized as a married couple in Colorado
at the time. 220 The cake was merely to celebrate that occasion. 221
This slight reference that Colorado was not a marriage equality
state at the time the couple ordered the cake from Phillips does
not reflect their intentions; instead it misconstrues the facts and
poses the dubious effect of insinuating that Craig and Mullins
were asking for something they were not legally entitled to, and
under that logic, Phillips would have been complicit had he
agreed to their cake request. In reality, Craig and Mullins was
only asking Phillips to create a wedding cake to celebrate their
legally-obtained, out-of-state marriage. Again, they were not
seeking Colorado’s recognition of their out-of-state marriage.
Kennedy’s factual mischaracterization is one step in denying
Craig and Mullins dignifying potential. After all, it would seem
hard to dignify—or even sympathize with—individuals who were
refused for seeking something that was illegal.
Another step toward denying dignifying potential is in
Kennedy’s lack of acknowledgment of the Craig and Mullins’
personal characteristics compared to the way he had handled the
personal facts of prominent Obergefell plaintiffs. Obergefell had
instances where Kennedy singled out assimilated traits of the
litigants in order to show that denying marriage rights was

219
220
221

138 S. Ct. at 1723.
Id. at 1724.
Id.
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discriminatory and demeaning. 222 Specifically, Kennedy had
depicted the personal stigma and harm of Jim Obergefell’s
erasure from his deceased husband’s death certificate, despite
having cared extensively for his dying husband; how marriage
discrimination threatened the family life of April DeBoer and
Jayne Rowse, a lesbian couple who were nurses and fostered
several children; and how Ijpe DeKoe, a diligent and honorable
member of the Army Reserve, was demeaned when his marriage
to Thomas Kostura was not recognized in their home state. 223 All
of this was done in close-up, dramatic effect.
By contrast, throughout his Masterpiece opinion, Kennedy
only mentions Craig and Mullins minimally, and when he does, it
is transactional either to recite procedure 224 or mere relevant
facts. 225 Such brief passages are devoid of any significant
personalizing characteristics. Kennedy refuses to explore just
how being denied a wedding cake as a same-sex couple demeaned
the couple’s human dignities. There were no extrapolations of
indignity—no dramatizations involving medical transport planes
or missing names on death certificates. 226 Instead, the only
passages that bring up the possibility that sexual orientation
discrimination can result in violating human dignity or stigma
are in two brief sections when Kennedy postulates about gay
couples and individuals in the abstract. 227 To Kennedy, it seems
quite possible that gay people can be demeaned in the
marketplace if denied goods and services. 228 But he never applies
such abstractions to Craig and Mullins’ sexual orientation
discrimination claim. Again, motivating this silent denial might
be the lack of sameness and respectability in Craig and Mullins’
identities, compared to litigants in the prior gay rights cases—
particularly in the marriage context. Consequently, Kennedy’s
rhetorical techniques for dignifying individuals—and with that,
his entire dignity jurisprudence—evades Craig and Mullins. This
result stands even when their CADA claim for sexual orientation
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
Id.
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723-24, 1725.
Id. at 1724.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727-28, 1732.
Id. at 1728
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discrimination had substantial merit, as attested in the lower
state forums. The incongruity is possible likely because at the
Supreme Court level the couple did not exhibit the “stable,” gay
assimilated characteristics that would have otherwise availed
them access to Kennedy’s respectability line of dignity
jurisprudence. They just did not garner the type of dignity for the
Court to fully sympathize with their pursuit of formal equality.
Rather than being just “gay enough” to succeed, Craig and
Mullins’ queerness seemed to have broken the boundaries that lie
at the core of what assimilationist strategies have done to
essentialize the gay identity. The destabilizing effect of their
queer sexualities undoubtedly clashed with the assimilationist
images of litigants in the marriage equality cases and probably
exceeded the Court’s tolerance of gay identities as well. As a
result, Craig and Mullins’ public personas perhaps deviated too
far from expected notions of gayness, cultivated from both
mainstream and gay assimilated angles—ideas which have stable
connotations that support the image of respectability. Quite
possibly, this deviation, as the following will discuss, contributed
to the Court’s reluctance to affirm their sexual orientation
discrimination claim because they might have seemed too far
from assimilated and too “queer” to connote the requisite
sameness and dignifying respectability. Instead, this incongruity
was likely a threat to the status quo.
C. PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO
Failing to satisfy each of Godsoe’s underscored
characteristics of assimilation likely prevented Craig and Mullins
from manifesting the version of gay assimilation and
respectability propagated in the marriage cases. Consequently,
the couple could not avail themselves as readily to the sameness
arguments that the Obergefell plaintiffs used in making their
collective case for marriage equality. They would have failed to
appear “normal.” In fact, they would have threatened the idea of
“normal.” Such distinctions afforded the Court opportunity to
reinforce its interest to preserve the status quo against any
interest to protect the couple’s queerness.
1. Reframing the Issues
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To add to Kennedy’s refusal to dignify Craig and Mullins’
queerness in the way he had dignified the gay assimilated
plaintiffs in the marriage cases, Kennedy also reframes the legal
issues from how the claims had been discussed below. The
Colorado Court of Appeals had observed that the dispute involved
both Craig and Mullins’ rights under CADA and Phillips’ claim
that his speech and religious expression rights were violated, but
then very quickly dismissed Phillips’ claim. 229 Kennedy, on the
other hand, begins his majority opinion by questioning the weight
of Colorado’s public accommodations law and its respect for
sexual minorities against a status quo that finds religious
intolerance compelling. 230 Then he articulates the issues as a
struggle between of the level of protection for the “rights and
dignity of gay persons who are or wish to be, married but who
face discrimination when they seek goods or services” 231 and “the
right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the
First Amendment, as applied to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 232 From here, it becomes even clearer
that the decision will weigh these competing interests, framed in
this way. In recapitulating the issues thusly, Kennedy also
legitimizes and raises the interest in protecting Phillips’ free
speech and religious exercise contentions. Indeed, he is focusing
on the interest to preserve the status quo. First, he observes
sympathetically that Phillips’ free speech claim is “an instructive
example, however, of the position that the application of
constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our
understanding of their meaning.” 233 Similarly, Kennedy finds
that “[t]he same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker
has a valid free exercise claim.” 234 He alludes to potentially
validating Phillips’ actions. In essence, the effort to which
Kennedy explains why Phillips’ free speech and religious exercise
claims might pose difficulty in this case begins to establish what
will be a plausible deniability that perhaps Phillips’ refusal could
See e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2015).
230 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
229

Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism.
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission.

2019]

QUEER SACRIFICE

43

be constitutionally protected in light of Craig and Mullins’ CADA
discrimination claim or suggest that he regards Phillips’ claims
with more urgency than previous venues had.
By juxtaposing of the issues and amplifying Phillip’s free
speech and religious exercise claims, Kennedy hints at his
potential deference to the status quo—one that is discriminatory.
After all, despite marriage equality victories and the increasing
positive image of sexual minorities in mainstream culture in the
handful of years since Lawrence, the status quo has continued to
recognize dominant religious views and sentiments—some that
invariably have led to severe inequalities and legal detriments for
sexual minorities and other marginalized people. Nevertheless,
such views have received constitutional protection. For instance,
in the face of legal and political advances for sexual minorities,
many states have enacted religious freedom acts. 235 In the same
vein, after Obergefell, some states have relied on religion to
motivate and legitimize bills that restrict restroom use for
transgender people. 236 And even the Supreme Court has recently
prioritized religion over some aspects of women’s reproductive
rights. 237 As for anti-discrimination laws, many states, unlike
Colorado, currently do not have legislation that protects sexual
minorities, 238 and the same can be echoed for the federal
government. 239
Whatever federal protections against
discrimination that sexual minorities have received are limited in
scope and have come by piecemeal through various federal
agencies or governmental branches. 240
In essence, a
discriminatory status quo that is partly validated and
perpetuated by religious freedom has received heightened legal
Findlaw,
Religious
Freedom
Acts
by
State,
Findlaw.org
https://civilrights.findlaw.com/discrimination/religious-freedom-acts-bystate.html.
236 Tom Dart, Transgender 'Bathroom Bill' Leaves Texas Christians Deeply
Divided, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/aug/06/transgender-bathroom -bill-texas-christians-lgbt-rights.
237 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
238 LGBTQ Americans Aren’t Fully Protected From Discrimination in 30 States,
Freedom for All Americans, https://www.freedomforallam ericans.org/states/.
239 Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 927
(2019).
240 E.g., Exec. Orders Nos. 11478 & 11246, 2014 WL 3569065 (Jul. 21, 2014).
235
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protections, and from the beginning of Masterpiece, Kennedy
raises a strong interest in preserving that status quo.
2. Weighing the Preservation Interest of the Status Quo
Of course, Craig and Mullins do not exhibit sufficient
dignity to match the interest to protect religious discrimination.
In their initial respondents’ brief, Craig and Mullins used dignity
to leverage interests. 241 At the same time, Phillips also contested
the couple’s dignitary interests. 242 Thus, before arguments, the
parties were already trying to access Kennedy’s dignity
jurisprudence. However, Craig and Mullins’ use of dignity
seemed less heightened compared to the use of dignity by the
Obergefell plaintiffs, which was much more direct in regards to
relying on interest convergence and had observed dignity within
contexts such as parenting and the discriminatory status quo. 243
Perhaps this less overt reliance on dignity and interest
convergence was so because the Masterpiece couple had already
prevailed against Phillips twice and technically had the law on
their side. After all, CADA did expressly protect against sexual
orientation discrimination. And cases such as Lawrence, Windsor,
and Obergefell all showed that the Court could favor same-sex
couples. Yet, the couple’s inability to play into the “respectable
dignity” that accessed Kennedy’s gay rights jurisprudence ends
up hurting their interests. 244 Their inability to seem respectable
because of their queerness affected the chances that their
interests would substantively align with the Court’s interests to
affirm the status quo. In fact, their queerness challenged and
threatened the status quo precisely through that inability to seem
respectable under establishment norms. Accordingly, the focus of
the opinion was heavily on Phillips’ religious freedom—and by
extension reinforcing the discriminatory status quo—even when
Phillips did not fit within any religious protections under CADA.
After all, the bakery was not a place “principally used for
religious purposes” exempted by CADA. 245 Therefore, technically
E.g., Brief for Respondents, supra n. __, at 41, 43.
Brief for Petitioner, supra n. __, at 25, 54-61.
243 Compare Brief for Respondents, supra n. __, with Brief for Petitioners at 1923, 31-32, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556).
244 Joshi, Respectable Dignity, supra n. __.
245 Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-34-601(1) (2017).
241
242
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the couple’s discrimination claim had more validity under CADA
than Phillips’ religious defenses.
Particularly in Section II of his Masterpiece opinion,
Kennedy underscores the primacy of protecting anti-gay religious
sentiments, despite no available CADA exception for Phillips.
Kennedy accomplishes this underscoring in part by articulating
how Craig and Mullins came up short in their dignified
respectability. As he states, “[o]ur society has come to the
recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as
social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.” 246 At first,
Kennedy seems consonant with his recognition of same-sex
couples in Obergefell. By itself, the statement seems absolute in
terms of protecting sexual minorities.
However, Kennedy
immediately qualifies his declaration by writing, “For that reason
the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,
protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of
their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great
weight and respect by the courts.” 247 By inserting how the
Constitution “can, and in some instances must” provide sexual
minorities civil rights protections, he suggests subtly that
negotiation exists at setting the level of interest in which
protections of civil rights based on sexual orientation are given—
that there must be situations in which the Constitution has less
interest in affording civil rights protections of sexual minorities
even if their freedoms “on terms equal to others” are subject to
“great weight and respect by the courts.” 248 Other commentators
have read this passage in Section II of Masterpiece Cakeshop with
greater optimism because just on these three sentences alone one
could read a friendly ambiguity in favor of sexual minorities into
Kennedy’s statement. 249 Such a reading, however, would ignored
the series of further qualifications that follow in which Kennedy
raises the importance of preserving religious views against samesex marriages: “At the same time, the religious and philosophical
Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
Id.
248 Id.
249 E.g., Elizabeth Sepper, More at Stake Than Cake — Dignity in Substance
and
Process,
SCOTUS
Blog
(Jun.
5,
2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-more-at-stake-than-cakedignity-in-substance-and-process/.
246
247
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objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some
instances protected forms of expression.” 250 Here is where
Kennedy repeats the disparity of interest levels. Like the
protection of the civil rights of sexual minorities, such religious
views against marriage equality are not absolute either. In the
commercial context, these views are subject to public
accommodation laws and would not survive so long as such laws
are general and neutrally applicable. 251 But he does not actually
critique how CADA itself is not general and neutrally applicable.
There is no direct attack premised on the opinion that Phillips’
bakery ought to have been exempt. He is just weighing the
interests.
Constitutionally,
despite
public
accommodations
legislation, he notes that the law could not compel members of a
religious clergy to perform same-sex wedding ceremonies if doing
so clashed with the free exercise of religion. 252 In fact, such
protections of a clergy member’s refusal, based on freedom of
religious exercise, to officiate a same-sex wedding ceremony is so
sufficiently “well understood in our constitutional order as an
exercise of religion” that Kennedy supposes sexual minorities
could subordinate their rights in the face of such refusal—as “an
exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without
serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth.” 253 Such
an overly-presumptuous observation patronizes and ignores the
indignities that sexual minorities have suffered at the hands of
religious exclusion. Yet again, the disparity of interest levels
exists and is demonstrated by how Kennedy subordinates the
interest of protecting sexual minorities beneath the interest for
religious protections. The passage potentially condones certain
acts of religious animus against sexual minorities, placing
exercise of religion over the protection of non-heteronormative
sexual identities. This priority exists even despite Kennedy’s
observation of that protection for free exercise of religion must be
“confined”; 254 otherwise, a mass commercial refusal to provide
250
251
252
253
254

138 S. Ct. at 1727.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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goods and services to sexual minorities might lead to “a
community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and
dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods,
services, and public accommodations.” 255 But it also shows that
there is enough room for Phillips to have validly refused Craig
and Mullins. In terms of dignity, this discussion implies a
hierarchical limitation; sexual minorities deserve some
constitutional protection based on their dignity, but not enough to
surpass some instances of free religious exercise. This hierarchy
resembles the Court’s prior reluctance to raise the lower-level
scrutiny analysis of sexual minorities—even in cases featuring
assimilated plaintiffs—such as in Windsor and reveals how the
Court actually views sexual orientation as a protectable trait
below other protectable identity traits. Kennedy seems to signal
that the Masterpiece couple could not confidently use their CADA
sexual orientation discrimination claim to breakthrough to a
fuller or higher treatment of formal equality for civil rights
protections of sexual minorities in this federal forum. Even when
Phillips and his bakery clearly did not fall within the CADA
religion exemption, his religious exercise rights conflict and ought
to be noted substantially enough as if he deserved exemption.
We see how Kennedy regards Phillips’ rights when he
directly examines Phillips’ claim. In examining Phillips’ account,
Kennedy sides with Phillips on his distinction that creating a
custom-ordered cake for Craig and Mullins would have used “his
artistic skill to make an expressive statement, a wedding
endorsement in [Phillips’] own voice and of his own creation.” 256
Here, Kennedy entwines both Phillips’ free speech and religious
justifications for refusing Craig and Mullins and finds that
“Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable given the
background and legal principles and administration of the law in
Colorado at that time” since Colorado had not yet recognized
same-sex marriages when Phillips’ refusal occurred. 257 In fact,
Kennedy finds that

255
256
257

Id.
Id. at 1728.
Id.
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there is some force to the argument that the baker
was not unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline
to take an action that he understood to be an
expression of support for their validity when that
expression was contrary to his sincerely held
religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was
limited to refusing to create and express a message
in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take
place in another State. 258
Kennedy seems to suggest that had Phillips reluctantly agreed to
create a cake for Craig and Mullins, this act would have severely
violated a term so personal to Phillips because of his religious
beliefs that the government would need to take notice. He notes
the three William Jack cake cases in which the Colorado Civil
Rights Division found it was lawful for three bakers to have
separately refused creating cakes that bore messages demeaning
sexual minorities or same-sex marriages 259 and noted that “[a]t
the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some latitude to
decline to create specific messages the storekeeper considered
offensive.” 260 All of his ruminations about the protections of
sexual minorities and exercise of religious freedom culminates in
qualifications that appear as if Kennedy is heavily posturing to
preserve what results in the bottom line regarding Phillips’
actions—that ultimately despite the dignity and worth the Court
has previously given to sexual minorities in the marriage equality
cases, and despite how Phillips is not exempted from CADA here,
formal equality for sexual minorities must give way to religious
freedom. Essentially the interest to protect sexual orientation
from discrimination is not on equal footing as interest in
protecting free exercise of religion. Categorical denial of services
and goods to sexual minorities based on a provider’s religious
beliefs would not be condoned, of course; however, as Kennedy
recognized, “Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful
consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case.” 261
On Phillips’ behalf, Kennedy reaches extensively to comprehend
258
259
260
261

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1729.
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Phillips’ moral and religious dilemma, reading the case narrowly
at the expense of diminishing the dignity and worth of Craig and
Mullins.
Overall, Kennedy essentially embeds a plausible
deniability favoring Phillips’ actions over the dignity of Craig and
Mullins’ sexual identities. Thus, he heavily prioritizes the
interest to preserve the discriminatory status quo in order to curb
the threat against it.
3. Religious Hostility
In truth, the tension between sexual orientation
antidiscrimination versus religious freedom that Kennedy raises,
explores, and then seemingly weighs in favor of Phillips never
comes to an actual determination on the merits. Kennedy never
proclaims the actual doctrinal dividing line between Phillips’
religious objections to same-sex marriage and the protections of
Craig and Mullins’ sexual identities from discrimination. He
never overrules CADA. So his prioritization of interests to
preserve the status quo is never given binding effect. Within the
factual contours of Masterpiece, Kennedy merely suggests that
the interest to preserve the status quo outweighs the interest to
protect Craig and Mullins’ sexual orientation from discrimination.
On the substantive legal merits of Craig and Mullins’
discrimination claim, the formal equality aspects would reach a
favorable outcome for the couple. CADA had stood on the couple’s
side. Even Kennedy admits that CADA expressly forbid sexual
orientation discrimination in the realm public accommodations. 262
Despite this, Kennedy effectuates preservation interest by
examining the case procedurally to reverse the Court of Appeals.
He reviews the public hearings on the matter by the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission and reads into the record religious
hostility displayed by members of the Commission sufficient for
him to violate religious neutrality. 263 Specifically, Kennedy
focuses on remarks that disparage personal religious beliefs:
At several points during its meeting, commissioners
endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot
legitimately be carried into the public sphere or
262
263

Id. at 1725.
Id. at 1729.
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commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs
and persons are less than fully welcome in
Colorado’s business community. One commissioner
suggested that Phillips can believe “what he wants
to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if
he decides to do business in the state.” . . . A few
moments later, the commissioner restated the
position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in
the state and he’s got an issue with the—the law’s
impacting his personal belief system, he needs to
look at being able to comprise.” 264
Although Kennedy admits that such statements could be
construed differently, he finds such comments are “more likely”
hostile toward Phillips. 265 He is convinced of observing more
religious hostility made at a later Commission public hearing that
furthered the animosity toward Phillips’ religious views. 266
Kennedy heavy-handedly compounds the Commission’s previous
statements he excerpted with a particular Commission member’s
individual quote criticizing societal uses of religion for advancing
discriminatory ends throughout human history—for instance,
That Commission
justifying slavery or the Holocaust. 267
member’s quote had ended on a personal tone, which Kennedy
expressly interprets as a disparagement that effectuated the
Commission’s alleged hostility to Phillips—that calling his
religious views “despicable” and contextualizing them as rhetoric
for advancing discrimination belittled and dehumanized such
views and actions. 268 Although Kennedy does not expressly use
“dignity” rhetoric here in these passages, he employs these
remote excerpts from the Commission’s extensive hearings and
review to draw conclusions that such remarks about Phillips’
religious views and acts ultimately demeaned Phillips. All in all,
Kennedy surmises that the Commission’s remarks had suggested
“that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in
Colorado’s business community”; could be seen as “inappropriate
264
265
266
267
268

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for
Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced”; and had
“disparaged [Phillips’] religion” in ways that characterized it as
“despicable,” and “something insubstantial and even insincere.” 269
Even without expressly using the word “dignity” here, Kennedy
tries to convince us that the Commission’s criticisms and
observations of Phillips’ “sincerely held religious beliefs” 270 were
a kind of hostility that violated Phillips’ personhood in some way.
Kennedy’s repeated characterizations of Phillips’ religious
motivations as “sincere” imply that Phillips was being genuine
and truthful about his religious beliefs. It also suggests that
Phillips’ actions against Craig and Mullins were somehow
blameless—that his refusal was somehow naturally justified
because they were backed by “sincere” religious beliefs against
same-sex marriages and that Phillips could not help himself from
acting inconsistently with his beliefs. As such, Kennedy again
views Phillips’ religiously-motived actions of sexual orientation
discrimination with a plausible deniability in favor of Phillips.
Because Phillips’ religiously-motived actions are backed by
“sincere” religious beliefs, the Commission’s public remarks on
record about Phillips’ exercise of religion—and the lack of
objections to these remarks at the hearings and in later appellate
review271—would always be taken as hostile, inappropriate, and
disparaging to Phillips’ personal character. In this way, Kennedy
moralizes and nearly essentializes Phillips’ religious identity. He
dignifies Phillips. This reasoning pantomimes the kind of dignity
rhetoric Kennedy had used in Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell
to show respectively how anti-sodomy laws, DOMA, and exclusion
to marriage all demeaned the identities of same-sex couples. He
ushers in such indication because the type of religious freedom
Phillips subscribes to, after all, is within the dominant status quo.
To Kennedy, the dignity in Phillips’ religious identity
unquestionably exists, and so it must be that his beliefs are
“sincere.”
This sense that Kennedy is not merely defending Phillips’
religious views, but Phillips’ dignity is even furthered by his
269
270
271

Id.
Id.
Id. 1729-30.
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comparisons between the Commission’s prior decisions in three
other Colorado cases where bakers had refused a customer who
had requested cakes that would have conveyed derogatory and
hateful messages about same-sex marriages. 272 Those bakers had
won their cases and lawfully legitimized their refusals before the
Commission on the basis of conscience. 273 Comparing those cake
cases to the present one before the Court, Kennedy finds that “the
Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did not
accord with its treatment of these other objections.” 274 To
perpetuate another example that the Commission had shown
religious hostility toward Phillips, Kennedy sides with Phillips’
view that “this disparity in treatment reflected hostility on the
part of the Commission toward his beliefs.” 275 In doing so,
Kennedy implies that the Commission had treated the consciencebased objections in the other cake cases as legitimate because the
Commission had equated designing a custom cake with
derogatory messages as an endorsement of that message;
meanwhile Kennedy finds the Commission’s treatment of
Phillips’s objection, and the Court of Appeals’ later disregard of
the comparison, both ignored a similar logic that baking Craig
and Mullins’ cake signified for Phillips as an endorsement of
same-sex marriage, which would violate his religious beliefs. 276
One could draw from Kennedy’s comparison that Phillips’
compliance with Craig and Mullins’ request would have been such
a violation of Phillips’ genuine religious sentiments against samesex marriage by becoming an endorsement adverse to his own
religious character—and by extension, to his religious identity.
In essence, by making that cake for Craig and Mullins, he would
be endorsing something that he did not believe in—so much so
that he could not even go along with it without it becoming
personal.
Again, therein lies the hostility, according to
277
One could argue that Kennedy was not merely
Kennedy.
defending Phillips’ sincerely-held religious beliefs here but also
defending Phillips’ religious identity.
272
273
274
275
276
277
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at 1730-31.
Id. at 1731.
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4. Speciousness and Questions of Motives
Kennedy’s religious hostility findings against Phillips
become specious and thin when his version of the Commission’s
lack of neutrality competes with the versions expounded in his
colleagues’ concurrences and dissents.
Whether the other
Justices have found lesser, deeper, or no violations of religious
neutrality, disagreement exists over both the Commission’s
remarks toward Phillips’ religiously-motivated refusal and the
handling of the William Jack cake cases below.
Such
disagreement calls into question the substance of Kennedy’s
religious hostility findings and illustrates the desperate attempt
to preserve the status quo.
Although in agreement with the majority’s overall ruling in
Masterpiece that religious hostility existed in lower proceedings,
Justice Kagan, with Justice Breyer joining, offers a lesser degree
of religious hostility in her concurrence. She suggests that the
Commission and the Court of Appeals’ regard for the different
results between the Masterpiece case here and the three other
Colorado cake cases was legally justified and not a sign of
religious hostility. 278 In her view, the different regard between
those cake refusals and Phillips’ hinged on factual interpretation:
“[I]n refusing that request, the bakers did not single out Jack
because of his religion, but instead treated him the same way
they would have treated anyone else—just as CADA requires. By
contrast, the same-sex couple in this case requested a wedding
cake that Phillips would have made for an opposite-sex couple.” 279
Such refusal violated CADA’s public accommodations protections
against sexual orientation discrimination. 280 In that way, “[t]he
different outcomes in the Jack cases and the Phillips case could
thus have been justified by a plain reading and neutral
application of Colorado law—untainted by any bias against a
religious belief.” 281 Kagan only agrees with Kennedy’s majority
that the views and sentiments of the Commission members at the
public hearings were religiously hostile, and thus, her version of
278
279
280
281

Id. at 1733-34 (Kagan & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 1733.
Id.
Id.
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religious hostility—though it exists enough in this case for her to
join in the Court’s reversal—seems less severe.
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, concurs by reexamining on his own terms the Commission’s treatment of the
other Colorado bakers’ refusals in those three cake cases and
Phillips.’ While Kagan had rendered that the cake that Craig and
Mullins had requested from Phillips was a wedding cake, Gorsuch
interprets that what Craig and Mullins had asked for was “a cake
celebrating a same-sex wedding.” 282 This interpretation allows
Gorsuch to read the fact patterns of the William Jack cake cases
and Masterpiece similarly and question the Commission’s and
Court of Appeals’ distinguishing of those cases from Phillips.’ If
the bakers were legally allowed to refuse Mr. Jack’s requests for
cakes that denigrated same-sex weddings because the messages
were morally offensive to the bakers, then Phillips should have
been able to refuse Craig and Mullins’ request for a cake
celebrating a same-sex wedding because same-sex marriages was
religiously repugnant to Phillips. 283 As he sees it, “[i]n both cases,
it was the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to
the bakers” 284 and that “[t]he problem here is that the
Commission failed to act neutrally by applying a consistent legal
rule.” 285 Gorsuch heightens that disparity with deeper analysis
than Kennedy does. But to see the cake as one that particularly
celebrates a same-sex wedding or marriage resembles the “special
rights” rhetoric that conservative opponents had lodged against
gay rights movement initiatives in the past. In this way,
Gorsuch’s deeper analysis engenders more animosity toward the
couple than Kennedy’s.
Likewise, Justice Thomas’ concurrence, joined by Gorsuch,
also seemed to deepen the religious hostility findings. Unlike
Gorsuch or Kagan, his concurrence focused exclusively on the free
speech claim that Kennedy had left unexplored in the majority
opinion. 286 Because Phillips refused Craig and Mullins on the
Id. at 1735 (Gorsuch & Alito, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 1735-36.
284 Id. at 1736.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 1740 (Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
282
283
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grounds that he was religiously opposed to same-sex marriage,
his act of refusal, which Thomas analyzes as speech, is invariably
entwined with religion. First, Thomas finds that for Phillips the
design and creation of custom wedding cakes is expressive enough
to qualify as speech. 287 In addition, Thomas finds that wedding
cakes themselves are highly symbolic, which further heightens
the expressiveness of creating them. 288 Thus, the act of creating
wedding cakes for Phillips is an expressive one for speech
protection. 289 As such, Thomas regards Craig and Mullins’
request as one that asked Phillips to create a cake for a same-sex
wedding and sought endorsement with the couple’s speech—not
his. 290
Thomas’ rationale here amplifies Phillips’ personal
endorsement when he creates a wedding cake—“Colorado is
requiring Phillips to be ‘intimately connected’ with the couple’s
speech”—and thus his First Amendment speech protections
arise. 291 Such speech would be antithetical to Phillips’ religious
identity, and Thomas demonstrates this by drawing out Phillips’
religious nature. 292 To add to this free speech violation to
Kennedy’s analysis deepens the findings of religious hostility in
the majority opinion.
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice
Sotomayor, completely disagrees with her colleagues’ finding of
religious hostility and she would have affirmed the ruling below
that Phillips’ refusal amounted to sexual orientation
discrimination against Craig and Mullins. 293 She contests the
majority’s finding of religious hostility. 294 First, she sides with
Kagan’s view that the Masterpiece cake was a wedding cake and
not a cake that had special meaning attributed to the baker. 295
Predictably, this take on the cake leads to the finding that Kagan
had asserted in comparing and ultimately contrasting Phillips’
refusal with the refusal of other Colorado bakers for requests to
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295

Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1743.
Id.
Id. at n. 3.
Id. at 1743 n. 3.
Id. at 1745.
Id. at 1752 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
See id. at 1748-49.
Id. at 1748 n. 1.
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bake cakes with anti-gay messages: “The different outcomes the
Court features do not evidence hostility to religion of the kind we
have previously held to signal a free-exercise violation.” 296 This
rendering would contradict one of Kennedy’s two reasons for
finding religious hostility. In Ginsburg’s opinion, she argues
against Gorsuch’s view that the case is about the kind of cake and
not the identity of the parties. Rather, “[w]hat matters is that
Phillips would not provide a good or service to a same-sex couple
that he would provide to a heterosexual couple.” 297 This reading
reveals her perspective that the cake was a wedding cake and not
a cake with a pro-marriage equality message: “When a couple
contacts a bakery for a wedding cake, the product they are
seeking is a cake celebrating their wedding—not a cake
celebrating heterosexual weddings or same-sex weddings—and
that is the service Craig and Mullins were denied.” 298 The reason
for that denial, as Ginsburg surmises, is Craig and Mullins’
sexual orientation. 299
Ginsburg also firmly contradicts Kennedy’s other reason
for finding religious hostility, which regarded certain Commission
members’ remarks as intolerant of Phillips’ religious views. Just
as the treatment of the other Colorado cake cases with Phillips’
refusal should not have prompted a reversal based on religious
hostility, “nor do the comments by one or two members of one of
the four decisionmaking entities considering this case justify
reversing the judgment below.” 300 In her perspective, “[w]hatever
one may think of the statements in historical context, I see no
reason why the comments of one or two Commissioners should be
taken to overcome Phillips’ refusal to see a wedding cake to Craig
and Mullins.” 301 To support her view here, she observed that the
lower proceedings also “involved several layers of independent
decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one” and
narrated four stages of rulings in Colorado before the case
reached the Supreme Court. 302 Such layers of adjudication make
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1749.
at 1750.
at 1749.
at 1751.
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Kennedy’s findings of religious hostility questionable and
hollow. 303
According to Ginsburg, even the Court’s prior
precedent on religious neutrality, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, “implicated a sole decisionmaking body” and not
the kind of proceedings on below in Masterpiece. 304 She would
have completely rendered an opposite opinion had she penned the
majority ruling.
Taken altogether, the differences amongst Masterpiece’s
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions over the existence,
intensity, and non-existence of religious hostility against Phillips
seems to suggest that the religious hostility issue was a tenuous
one to consider.
Did religious hostility exist in both the
Commission member’s remarks against Phillips’ religious views
and how the Commission distinguished Phillips’s refusal in
Masterpiece from the bakers’ refusals in the William Jack cases,
as Kennedy argues in the majority? Or did religious hostility only
exist in the remarks and not in the way Kennedy or Gorsuch read
the Commission’s distinguishing of the other cake case, as Kagan
writes in her concurrence? Did it arise within the free speech
violation as well, as Thomas seems to suggest? Was the religious
hostility more intense and more pernicious than Kennedy’s
majority suggest, as Gorsuch tries to demonstrate in his
reconciliation of the William Jack cake cases and Masterpiece? Or
did neither the remarks nor the Commissions’ distinguishing of
the William Jack cake cases from Masterpiece amount to any
religious hostility in the lower proceedings, as Ginsburg tries to
prove? There is no consensus, revealing that the Court’s review
of general applicability in Masterpiece is thin and potentially
specious. Perhaps enough religious hostility exists or not. It
suggests the possibility that the Court’s rendering was not quite
accurate, but instead it was the best argument to make in light of
stronger, more definite facts that sexual orientation
discrimination did occur under CADA when Phillips refused to
fulfill Craig and Mullins’ request. And that best argument—
religious hostility that violates general applicability—is a
contentious and debatable one, at best. That emphatic urgency in
Masterpiece to stick with such a questionable argument as the
303
304

Id.
Id. at 1751-52.
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crux to overturning the prior state court ruling of sexual
orientation discrimination possibly reveals a tension—even with
some of the non-conservative justices—for finding sexual
orientation as a trait worthy of fuller protections, even after
Obergefell. Or it could exemplify the Justices’ tension with the
kind of sexual minority litigants this time before the Court. In
essence, the Court seems to articulate a higher interest in
preserving a discriminatory status quo over affirming an instance
of sexual orientation anti-discrimination. Sexual orientation as a
protectable trait against discrimination reached some progress in
Obergefell, but never at the kind of heightened scrutiny
protections that race or gender has received. And that limited
progress is definitely underscored by the interests the Court
anxiously engenders around religious freedom in this sexual
orientation discrimination case.
The instability of the religious hostility argument amongst
Justices of the Masterpiece Court, hence, raises questions of
motives.
The case’s resolution through Kennedy’s majority
opinion depends on the Justices’ review of the procedural aspects
of the lower proceedings in order to dispense with the task of
determining the couple’s sexual orientation discrimination claim
under CADA. That strategic reliance on procedure forecloses any
substantive review between Craig and Mullins’ antidiscrimination interests and Phillips’ religious interests—a
substantive review that could have sided in favor of the couple as
the Commission and the Court of Appeals exhibited strong
findings of discrimination in their CADA reviews. Not to
mention, the Court’s review of the procedures on below is directly
related to Phillips’ religion—directly attached to interests in
preserving a discriminatory status quo though religious freedom.
Consequently, the Court highlights the interests of the status quo
preservation over protecting sexual minorities—here, sexual
minorities who showed little resemblance to the assimilated
sexual minorities in Obergefell. Of course, it will be unknown,
given the way the Court handled its decision to reverse
Masterpiece, whether Craig and Mullins would have prevailed
here had they exhibited more of the same traits that the plaintiffs
from the marriage equality cases had exhibited. However, in
terms of sexual orientation, one view remains evident from
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Masterpiece. When confronted with religion—even in the context
of marriage—queer sexual identities rather than assimilated ones
engender much less deference with the Court. In Masterpiece, the
Court’s conception of sexual orientation anti-discrimination at
this time very likely does not include protection of less
assimilated, less mainstream sexual minorities.
Indeed, the primacy that Kennedy gives to protecting
Phillips’ exercise of religion is so paramount that it makes
deference to religion seem circuitous and difficult to critique.
After all, acts of discrimination are often harbored from some
forms of animus. 305 In pinpointing discrimination, drawing such
motives help to establish that an act of discrimination occurred.
However, because Kennedy finds that even the Commission’s
comparison remark about the historical use of religion to advance
discrimination had tarnished Phillips’ religious identity rather
than serve to constructively demonstrate religiously-motivated
discrimination, future adjudicating bodies must tread very
carefully when their fair and neutral application of laws are
prompted in religion cases. Such perspective on the Court’s
finding of religious hostility has scholarly support. According to
Leslie Kendrick and Micah Swartzman,
[i]n Masterpiece, the Court mistook the neutral
application of civil rights law for what Justice Scalia
once called a “fit of spite.” The Commission's
decision to deny Phillips a religious exemption was
not the product of religious hostility, but rather a
good faith effort to interpret and apply CADA, which
forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in public accommodations. In holding
that the Commission failed to treat Phillips’s claims
with neutrality and respect, the Court improperly
applied free exercise doctrine to the facts of the case,
finding unconstitutional hostility and intolerance
where there were none. 306

E.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 133, 145 (2018).
305
306
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Correspondingly, the effect of Masterpiece, in regards to future
application of neutrality, seems unclear according to John Inazu:
"The [Masterpiece Court’s] jurisprudence means that we’re going
to have state-by-state norms that vary quite a bit . . . about what
counts as protections for religious freedom.” 307 These comments
and the different versions (or in Ginsburg’s case, non-version) of
religious hostility render Kennedy’s finding and use of religious
hostility in the majority opinion shaky. Indirectly, it could
exhibit the Court’s hasty anxiety to prioritize the interest to
protect religious freedom within a discriminatory status quo over
interest to promote sexual orientation anti-discrimination. It
serves as another possible sign of failure to satisfy the requisite
interest convergence needed for Craig and Mullins’ success.
All of this demonstrates the heightened interest the Court
gives to preserving a discriminatory status quo in Masterpiece.
Not only does Kennedy prioritize the interest toward protecting
religious freedoms more heavily than the interest in protecting
against sexual orientation discrimination, but he then
demonstrates how paramount that interest is—in fact, he
reinforces it—when he reverses the sexual orientation
discrimination ruling on procedural grounds that the Colorado
proceedings did not sufficiently respect Phillips’ “sincere”
religious beliefs. 308 At the end of the Court’s majority opinion,
even despite Colorado’s interest in protecting sexual orientation
discrimination as CADA articulates and despite the state’s
adjudicated findings that Phillips’ refusal was sexual orientation
discrimination against Craig and Mullins, this interest in
preserving a discriminatory status quo stands strong and
towering. But in reaching that towering fortification, Kennedy
and the concurring Justices seem to have offered an unsatisfying
finding of religious hostility. It belies a deep, pernicious sense of
queer anxiety against Craig and Mullins fueled by a perception
that the status quo was threatened.

Tom Gjelten, Court Sees 'Hostility' To Religious Beliefs In Case Of Baker
And
Same-Sex
Couple,
NPR
(Jun.
5,
2018)
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/05/617029562/colorado-bakers-supreme-courtwin-revives-religious-freedom -debate.
308 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
307
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D. QUEER SACRIFICE
Speciousness and anxiousness in the Court’s religious
hostility finding leaves a frustrating regard for Kennedy’s
opinion. Can such a dubious reasoning undo what had been a
strong showing of sexual orientation discrimination under CADA?
Craig and Mullins was refused service and goods because of their
sexual orientation. Phillips was not exempt under CADA’s
religious exception.
However, looking at the case through
interest convergence theory, the ruling makes more sense
psychologically because, although the law stands thinly, the
motives are clear. Under the Court’s perception, Craig and
Mullins likely threatened the status quo.
But if the only conclusion drawn from observing the lack of
interest convergence in Masterpiece is that dominant
authorities—i.e. the Supreme Court—are reluctant to protect less
unassimilated sexual minorities, then merely noticing the
absence of converging interests would be a limiting feat. The
utility of seeing Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory
demonstrated in the context of gay rights would be constrained as
well—like the Court’s majority decision, only half-baked. Further
significance exists in observing that the Court’s interest in
preserving a discriminatory status quo had outweighed any
interest toward protecting sexual minorities, such as Craig and
Mullins, from religious discrimination.
What Masterpiece
actually demonstrates is not merely that Bell’s interest
convergence thesis exists in the gay movement’s progression, but
what Anthony Kreis had identified when he applied Bell’s
interest convergence thesis as a predictive model for future gay
rights advancements.
He had reiterated Bell’s thesis of
involuntary sacrifice in the sexual minority context—a theory
Bell called “racial sacrifice” that compliments interest
convergence thesis to form what Bell referred to as “racial
fortuity.” 309
In writing several years before Obergefell and
Masterpiece, Kreis was right to import Bell’s racial sacrifice thesis
here. Masterpiece’s misalignment of interests—its lack of interest
Kreis, supra n. __, at 121-22; Derrick Bell, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE U NFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 69
(2004) [hereinafter Bell, SILENT COVENANTS].
309
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convergence—resembles that involuntary sacrifice. Indeed as the
following explains, Masterpiece is an instance of queer sacrifice.
1. Bell’s Theory
For Bell, interest convergence helped clarify why the Court
in Brown v. Board of Education had the opportunity to overturn
its previous segregation holding in Plessy v. Ferguson. 310 The
theory offered a predictive mechanism for exploring when
dominant powers would ever accommodate marginalized groups.
Yet, interest convergence is merely one piece of Bell’s later theory
of racial fortuity. In the context of that racial fortuity theory,
interest convergence is merely one variable that is complimented
by another theory: racial sacrifice. Within the struggles to
overcome racial inequality, Bell defined racial sacrifice as the way
“the society is always willing to sacrifice the rights of black people
in order to protect important economic or political interests of
whites.” 311 Bell later reiterated racial sacrifice as a predictive
moniker—in the inverse logic of interest convergence—to expect
when the white dominant power will decide not to weld their
authority for legal and political change that would help advance
interests of marginalized racial groups, such as AfricanAmericans: “Even when interest-convergence results in an
effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the point
that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening the
superior societal status of whites, particularly those in the middle
and upper classes.” 312 Both interest convergence and racial
sacrifice are “two sides of the same coin. The two-sided coin, with
involuntary racial sacrifice on the one side and interestconvergent remedies on the other, can be referred to as racial
fortuity.” 313 Consequently, Bell conceptualizes the underpinnings
of racial progress through “racial fortuity,” which are animated by
instances of interest convergence and racial sacrifice. 314 And if
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Derrick Bell, “Here Come De Judge”: The Role of Faith in Progressive
Decision-Making, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Bell, “Here Come
De Judge”].
312 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 69.
313 Id.
314 Kathleen A. Bergin, Mixed Motives: Regarding Race and Racial Fortuity, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274 (2006).
310
311
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one views racial fortuity as the way American society has
achieved racial justice, then one would assume very
pessimistically that racial justice occurs not through “hard-earned
entitlement” but is “pre-ordained” through this mechanism of
racial fortuity plotted by converging interests and racial sacrifice,
alternating side-by-side. 315
Bell noticed examples of involuntary racial sacrifice in
several American historical moments. For example, he saw racial
sacrifice during the original drafting of the Constitution when
slavery was protected to bolster slave owner support for the
document. 316 Bell also considered the Hayes-Tilden Compromise
in 1877 that staved off resurgence of the Civil War as racial
sacrifice at the expense of the rights of Southern blacks. 317 As a
third example, he also saw racial sacrifice in the way that the
Court in Plessy constitutionally permitted segregation as a way to
engender white support for existing economic policies that were
not favoring white people. 318
Within the school desegregation era after Brown, Bell
adopted the view that white resistance to desegregation lingered
long after the landmark decision, which affected implementation
of desegregation but that decision itself had left room for white
resistance through its subtle deference to Southern whites. 319
Kathleen Bergin, in her study of Bell’s racial fortuity theory,
concentrates on this observation as a way that the Brown
eventually led to racial sacrifice:
The seeds of racial sacrifice were planted even prior
to the announcement of Brown, when a number of
Justices voiced concern during the Court's judicial
conferences for the impact desegregation would have
on Whites. No matter how irrational “prosegregation
emotion,” Justice Jackson wrote, “we can hardly deny
the existence of sincerity and passion of those who
think that their blood, birth and lineage are
315
316
317
318
319

Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 9.
Bell, “Here Come De Judge,” supra n. __, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 95.
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something worthy of protection by separatism.”
Justice Reed was even more solicitous, urging the
Court to “start with the idea that there is a large and
reasonable body of opinion in various states that
separation of the races is for the benefit of both.” The
record suggests that several Justices agreed to strike
down segregation on the condition that Chief Justice
Warren draft an opinion that did not require
immediate implementation from the South. 320
In tone, the passages of Justices Robert Jackson and Stanley
Reed on the Brown Court sharply resemble the deference that
Kennedy gave in Obergefell to those who opposed same-sex
marriages, whom he characterized as acting “in good faith” in
their religious belief and “reasonable and sincere.” 321
In
Masterpiece, sincerely-held religious antipathy toward same-sex
marriages became the focus of defense by the majority. In
addition, Bergin observes that in implementing Brown, the
Court’s “all deliberate speed” standard for schools to comply with
desegregation left some directives unclear:
The [Brown] decree instructed local school boards to
make a “prompt and reasonable start” towards full
desegregation, but district courts charged with
monitoring compliance were never told when
desegregation should begin, when it should end, or
what pace of progress to demand in between. They
were instead instructed to move cautiously and
authorized to interrupt a desegregation plan once it
began if circumstances warranted “additional time.”
The Justices hoped this cooling off period would
induce voluntary compliance from the South, but
only prolonged delay by relinquishing oversight to
“the most recalcitrant judge and the most defiant
school board.” 322

320
321
322

Bergin, supra n. __, at 285.
135 S. Ct. at 2594.
Bergin, supra n. __, at 285.
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By analogy, the Obergefell Court mandated marriage equality by
state courts, but left the contours of implementations vague—
especially the tensions with religious freedom—which led to
resistance immediately after the decision with local clerks
refusing to issue marriage licenses 323 and judges who tried to
disobey the ruling, 324
To further hone in on her observation of racial sacrifice in
the desegregation era, Bergin observes that “[i]mmediately after
Brown, the Court let stand a series of district court judgments
that distinguished between ‘integration’ and ‘desegregation’ by
recognizing a right of White school children to avoid compulsory
integration with Blacks.” 325 Lower courts followed suit and
eventually “[t]he distinction between ‘desegregation’ and
‘integration’ established in these cases led to the proliferation of
‘freedom of choice’ plans, transfer provisions and other measures
that maintained actual segregation while purporting to comply
with Brown.” 326 Here it is not difficult to compare Bergin’s
identification of racial sacrifice post-Brown and the Obergefell
Court’s deference to religious beliefs to the Masterpiece Court’s
use of religious exercise to foreclose sexual orientation
antidiscrimination. Between Bell and Bergin, their post-Brown
observations of racial sacrifice resemble the homophobic reactions
after Obergefell and stalled progress in Masterpiece.
2. Queering Bell’s Theory in Masterpiece
If one can conclude that interest convergence did occur in
Obergefell and in other gay rights decisions 327—then it is also
possible to apply the rest of Bell’s thesis toward interpreting the
mechanism of advancements in justice for sexual minorities. If
E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kentucky Clerk Defies Court on Marriage Licenses
TIMES
(Aug.
13,
2015),
for
Gay
Couples,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/kentucky-rowan-county-same-sexmarriage-licenses-kim-davis.html.
324 E.g., Campbell Robertson, Roy Moore, Alabama Judge, Suspended Over Gay
TIMES
(May
6,
2016),
Marriage
Stance,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/judge-roy-moore-alabama-same-sexmarriage.html.
325 Bergin, supra n. __, at 286.
326 Id. at 286.
327 See Khuu, supra n. __, at 214-24; see also Kreis, supra n. __, at 142-51.
323

Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism.
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission.

66

QUEER SACRIFICE

[Vol. __

Obergefell signified interest convergence, then Masterpiece with
its lack of converging interests could stand an example of the kind
of involuntary sacrifice akin to what Bell and Bergin pegged as
racial sacrifice post-Brown—only here perhaps what the
Masterpiece decision represents is a moment of “queer sacrifice.”
To reiterate the definition of racial sacrifice, Bell’s own
pronouncement is used: “Even when interest-convergence results
in an effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the
point that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening
the superior societal status of whites, particularly those in the
middle and upper classes.” 328 Bell’s theory is applicable to
Masterpiece. At the start of the case, the effective remedy
available to sexual minorities against sexual orientation
discrimination was Colorado’s public accommodations law. 329
CADA’s inclusion of sexual orientation likely resulted in interest
convergence at the state level, since that category was not always
included in the act. As Kennedy even notes in Masterpiece,
CADA’s protection of sexual minorities against discrimination in
places of public accommodation was an addition made in 2007
and 2008. 330 Prior to this amendment, sexual orientation had
been an absent trait for CADA protection. In this way, the
Colorado state legislature’s later addition to include sexual
orientation as a protected class within its state antidiscrimination
law was likely an instance of interest convergence that resulted in
a remedy for protecting sexual minorities. 331 This specific
instance of interest convergence could have been facilitated also
by the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans in 1996, striking down
Colorado’s Amendment 2, which specifically denied protections for
sexual orientation discrimination. 332
In addition, since
Masterpiece was following the Court’s marriage equality decision
in Obergefell, an interpretation could also be made that interest
convergence could have contributed to another effective remedy
for sexual minorities here, even though the facts of Masterpiece
Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 69.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §24-34-605 (2017).
330 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1725.
331 See Matt Simonsen, Master File, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm., __ U.S. __ (2017): Legislative History of SB08-200 (Sept. 23,
2017), http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/research-data/8/.
332 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
328
329
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pre-dated the Obergefell decision. The references to Obergefell in
respondents’ briefs could reasonably allow such an inference;
Craig and Mullins were trying to use Obergefell to leverage the
outcome of their case. 333 Thus, likely the Court’s own interest
convergence in Romer and Obergefell influenced the available
relief at this judicial level of review. In other words, the couple
had CADA on their side—especially after the lower proceedings.
But they were also following Obergefell directly, and had Romer
in the remote shadows. Alternatively, one could plausibly read
CADA as the only remedial relief available for Craig and Mullins
or respectively use Obergefell to that same effect—hence the
various starting points for grafting Bell’s theory of racial sacrifice
onto Masterpiece. However, because Masterpiece was a Supreme
Court decision reviewing CADA, a conflation of both CADA and
prior Supreme Court gay rights cases seems more appropriate for
satisfying the extension of Bell’s sacrifice theory here.
From here, it is possible to read into Masterpiece the effect
that Craig and Mullins’ less-assimilated, destabilizing sexual
identities had toward producing the Court’s reversal of their
successful CADA discrimination claim against the religious
baker, Phillips. Borrowing Bell’s description of racial fortuity,
conditions that had been fortuitous for marriage equality and
same-sex couples in the Obergefell case were now changed in
Masterpiece. 334 As discussed above, the Masterpiece couple did
not embody the assimilated traits of the Obergefell plaintiffs and
they did not share perceived mainstream American
characteristics or demographics, nor did they seem similar to the
identities of the Justices themselves.
Instead, their queer
identities deemed them more like outsiders to either the
American mainstream or elite, assimilated gay populations.
Instead of fitting in with perceived heteronormative ideals of
family and gender roles, Craig and Mullins played with
androgyny and repeatedly displayed their sexuality in public for
the media to harness. They did not have family-oriented
obligations such as childrearing. When they should have been
more politically quiet, they did not relent. They did not present
themselves as having respectable jobs or careers. Outside of
333
334

Brief for Respondents, supra n. __, at 1-2, 42-43.
Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 9.
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traditional dominant ideas about gender, family, and
respectability, they appeared threatening to the heteronormative
status quo in ways that the Obergefell plaintiffs had not. Their
perceived non-conformity cost them.
Moreover, their discrimination claim involved religious
beliefs that reaffirmed the dominant, heteronormative status
quo—specifically Christian beliefs against same-sex marriages
held by a deeply-religious merchant. In following Bell’s theory of
racial sacrifice, it might be possible enough for queer sacrifice to
take place when the facts present a sexual orientation
discrimination suit filed by a same-sex couple whose destabilizing
sexual identities threaten the status quo more than other
assimilated same-sex couples would. However, what could seem
even more threatening to the Court was how that sexual
orientation discrimination suit by this non-conforming queer
couple directly confronted religion through a moment of Christian
antipathy toward same-sex marriages. This direct confrontation
with religion offered the tipping point to which the Court
responded by reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision favoring
the couple, not by finding fault with the CADA claim itself but
through a questionable finding of religious hostility with the
lower proceedings. It could be likely that the Court’s protection of
religion—thus reflecting its interest in protecting the
heteronormative status quo—was provoked by anxiety over
having to protect queerness under CADA, even if marriage
equality legally existed. The reversal in Masterpiece seemed
likely as an abrogation of effective remedies under CADA because
otherwise the couple’s use of remedies under CADA would
somehow threaten the dominant group. It would have led to an
acknowledgement of their queerness.
Accordingly, Masterpiece extends of Bell’s racial sacrifice
theory—but as an instance of queer sacrifice.
If interest
convergence has already been observed in other moments within
the LGTBQ movement, then one could plausibly read instances in
which sexual minorities did not prevail, such as Masterpiece here,
as queer sacrifice within a similar—perhaps, identical—
mechanism of sexual minority justice similar to Bell’s theory of
racial fortuity. Only here, we have queer fortuity instead of racial
fortuity. Precisely in this comparison, examples of interest
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convergence and queer sacrifice could also animate advances for
sexual minorities consonant with how Bell’s thesis offers specific
strategies against the mechanisms of subordination and injustice
in the racial justice context. As much as this Part III has shown
that Bell’s thesis has been appropriate for explaining Masterpiece,
his thesis can also guide forward. Part IV explores such
possibilities.
IV. QUEER FORTUITY
At first glance, the Masterpiece decision ought to engender
various levels of pessimism for sexual minorities in the postmarriage equality era. From Part III’s discussion, the decision
reveals significant limits with the level of formal legal equality
that assimilated same-sex couples had received in Obergefell.
Masterpiece illustrates the constraints of both marriage rights
and sameness arguments, and exhibits the lengths at which the
Court will take to preserve a discriminatory status quo in light of
protecting sexual minorities who appear less mainstream. This
result is so even when Craig and Mullins had an effective legal
remedy to secure under CADA. Legal commentators have drawn
multiple conclusions about the case depending on each
commentator’s the level of pessimism. Some regard the decision
as narrow; while others disagree. 335 But by applying Bell’s
theory, this Article has argued that Masterpiece was a setback for
the gay movement—a movement that has by now largely shifted
away from employing grassroots liberationist tactics pinned on
transforming existing hegemony to more assimilative strategies
rooted in identity politics and single-issue causes that are often
more salient to what matters to the elite-tier demographic of the
sexual minority population.
A. CHANGED CONDITIONS

Compare Amy Howe, Court Rules (Narrowly) for Baker in Same-SexWedding-Cake
Case,
SCOTUS
Blog
(Jun.
4,
2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-rules-narrowly-forbaker-in-same-sex-wedding-cake-case/, with Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg,
Masterpiece Cakeshop—Not as Narrow as May First Appear, SCOTUS Blog
(Jun. 5, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-masterpiececakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-m ay-first-appear/.
335

Forthcoming, to be published in the Yale Journal of Law & Feminism.
Please do not cite or circulate without author’s permission.

70

QUEER SACRIFICE

[Vol. __

As the Court’s reversal of Craig and Mullins’ CADA
discrimination claim has perhaps showed, so long as the kind of
sexual minorities seeking remedial protection under antidiscrimination laws seem to pose a threat to the status quo, the
interest to protect them is less aligned than when the litigants
seemed more assimilated and respectable. As a result, the status
quo will be preserved if a solution to do so exists. In Masterpiece,
that solution involved prioritizing an already-existing aspect of
the dominant status quo: anti-gay religious belief. As an
instance of queer sacrifice, the Court used religious freedom to
undo the substance of Craig and Mullins’ public accommodations
claim of sexual orientation discrimination, while legitimizing
Phillips’ right to refuse the couple’s wedding cake request because
of his religious beliefs.
Masterpiece’s legal contours, of course, beg the question of
how sexual orientation anti-discrimination claims at the Court
might succeed in the future. A few weeks after releasing the
decision, Justice Kennedy, the swing vote and author of previous
gay rights decisions, as well as the author of Masterpiece’s
majority opinion here, retired from the Court’s membership. 336
With his retirement, the Court’s new composition tips ever more
socially and politically conservative, and thus, more directionally
challenged to recognizing the rights of sexual minorities. 337 Even
if anti-discrimination legislation that protects sexual identity
were to pass federally, such as the proposed Equality Act, 338 what
would prevent the Court from denying an otherwise valid
instance of sexual orientation discrimination if the interests of
uphold such protection failed to converge with the interests of
status quo protection? Given what occurred in Masterpiece, what
Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire,
TIMES
(Jun.
27,
2018),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retiresupreme-court.html.
337 Adam Liptak, Confirming Kavanaugh: A Triumph for Conservatives, but a
TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2018),
Blow
to
the
Court’s
Image,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/conservative-supreme-courtkavanaugh.html.
338 Jacob Ogles, Pelosi Prioritizing LGBTQ Equality Act as Speaker, ADVOCATE
(Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.advocate.com/politics/2019/1/04/pelosi-prioritizinglgbtq-equality-act-speaker.
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could prompt the Court not to commit other moments of queer
sacrifice in future cases?
Conditions have veritably changed. The Court is now a
less gracious and promising venue for sexual minorities than
when it decided the marriage cases. But the problem of strategy
for true equality should not have been exclusively hinged on the
legal forum. 339 Assimilationist strategies based on changing
organizational practices in the gay movement that survived since
AIDS epidemic campaigns have professionalized the face of gay
rights lobbying and political organization. 340 Some of the blame
for the limitations in Masterpiece lies also within the narrower,
single-issue approaches—such as marriage equality—that
funneled gay rights into identity politics and a politics of
respectability. Unfortunately, respectability politics played into
the dominance and power of the mainstream culture, rather than
gaining equal footing with the mainstream. Perhaps engaging
within a politics of respect for all types of sexual identities,
instead, would have avoided a more accommodating position
against the mainstream.
Even worse, if Bell was correct in interpreting his own
racial fortuity theory, then his observation stands that racial
progress—and likely advancements for other marginalized
groups—are “pre-ordained” by the back-and-forth process of
interest convergence and involuntary sacrifice at the hands of the
dominant power rather than considered as “hard-earned
entitlement[s].” 341 Placing this notion within the context of
sexual orientation antidiscrimination, Bell’s remark here about
the illusion of hard-earned entitlements in successes driven by
interest convergence would even pierce or debunk the
respectability politics that the Obergefell plaintiffs had courted
with in order to obtain married equality. One previous strand of
conceptualizing Obergefell has focused on how same-sex couples
there had earned their entitlement to marriage through their
appearances of respectability—by how much their sameness
Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 185-86.
Marie-Amélie George, The LGBT Disconnect: Politics and Perils of Legal
Movement Formation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 503, 535 (2018).
341 Bell, SILENT COVENANTS, supra n. __, at 9.
339
340
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dignified themselves enough for the Court to extend to them
fundamental rights to marry, rather than by their showing of any
intrinsic human worth or any inherent dignity. However, if
applying racial fortuity to explain gay rights advancements, then
Bell would perhaps offer an even more cynical view than
respectability politics. His theory would deny the view of success
in Obergefell as any hard-earned entitlement. Rather, his theory
of fortuity grafted here would conclude that equality for sexual
minorities in Obergefell was driven by conditions beyond the
control of sexual minority litigants themselves and that “[i]ts
departure, when conditions change, is preordained,” 342 as it did in
Masterpiece. In this view, Obergefell’s success was pre-ordained
by changing conditions that provided sufficient interest
convergence; it was not necessarily and solely earned through a
showing of respectability.
B. MASTERPIECE’S MISSED FORTUITY
Nevertheless, even if Bell’s theory about racial fortuity
could be extended to comprehend the legal and political
advancements for sexual minorities, this thesis ought not to stifle
the movement, nor the aspirations for true equality. Indeed, to
combat the dilemma of racial fortuity, Bell responded with a
strategy he called “forged fortuity.” 343 Drawing on the view here
that Masterpiece represents queer sacrifice and that the
movement for advancing true equality for sexual minorities could
be similarly understood within Bell’s racial fortuity thesis—
albeit, “queer fortuity” here—sexual minorities might benefit
from Bell’s call to persist with forged fortuity, which he described
as focusing less on the judiciary for results and “more on tactics,
actions, and even attitudes that challenge the continuing
assumptions of white dominance.” 344 In particular, Bell had
insisted that African-Americans “initiate and support actions that
seemingly fly in the face of interest-convergence principles when
those actions make life more bearable for blacks in a society
where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class.” 345 In such a
342
343
344
345

Id.
See, e,g., id. at 190.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 190.
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way, “[r]ecognition of our true state will serve as a gateway to an
era where we forge fortuity, that is defy the workings of the
involuntary sacrifices and interest-convergence determinants of
racial policies and practices.” 346 Bell’s examples of forged fortuity
included the lunch counter sit-in protests by African-Americans
that allowed them to “overcome traditional laws of trespass and
breach of the peace” and prompted leaders of such protests “to
think and plan within a context of ‘what is’ (the existing problem)
rather than simply rely on the abstract concept of equality.” 347
For Bell, the crux of these sit-in protests for explaining forged
fortuity strategies was “that a great many whites would not
maintain discriminatory policies if the cost was too high.” 348
Likewise, Bell’s example of the strategies employed by William
Robert Ming, a lawyer defending Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in a
state income tax fraud claim, also displayed forged fortuity tactics
that “articulate[d] racially realistic positions that touch some
whites in the pocketbook, [and expected] that their sense of
justice [would] follow.” 349 In the suit that charged King with
evading taxes by not reporting the funds retained by his Southern
Christian Leadership Conference as his own taxable income,
Ming defended Dr. King by boosting the number of businessmen
in his all-white jury so that he could effectively win the case by
convincing them that to find against Dr. King, they would be
establishing a new precedent that would permit Alabama to
“calculated your income taxes based on the total monies you have
in your checking accounts.” 350 Thus, Ming changed the conditions
and forged fortuity by showing how costly it would be for whites
to discriminate against Dr. King. In some ways, one could
recapitulate that forged fortuity represents action by a
marginalized group to maximize self-interest in a way that
harnesses the group’s power (rather than playing into the
dominant authority) to drive forth common interests between the
marginalized and dominant groups for producing meaningful,
even transformative, change.

346
347
348
349
350

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 191.
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By interpreting major gay rights cases, such as Obergefell
and Masterpiece, through an extension of Bell’s theories, we
receive insight about how such successes and defeats gained and
suffered by sexual minorities are actually still predicated within
the status quo, rather than actual victories that transform the
status quo. Thus, in hindsight, perhaps Craig and Mullins might
have benefitted from legal arguments that had a larger focus on
forging fortuity, rather than relying predominately on
persuasions based within constitutional doctrine. Like the lunch
counter sit-ins or William Robert Ming’s defense of Dr. King,
Craig and Mullins might have raised reasons why sustaining
discrimination against sexual minorities might not be
economically viable for those controlling the status quo—not to
say that this line of reasoning would have categorically altered
Masterpiece’s course, but it perhaps would have played into
neoliberal sensibilities of the Supreme Court Justices without
affecting respectability politics. 351 On below, the Colorado Court
of Appeals had raised the economics issue, by noting that sexual
orientation discrimination in public places incur “measurable
adverse economic effects.” 352 The Court of Appeals had even
referenced a Michigan study that discussed how discriminatory
business practices against sexual minorities had negative
economic impacts on employers and for business profits statewide. 353 On appeal to the Supreme Court in Masterpiece, the
petitioner’s brief by Phillips’ attorneys unilaterally contested this
point, downplaying the Court of Appeals’ analysis. 354 But neither
the Commission’s nor Craig and Mullins’ respondents’ briefs
meaningfully addressed the economics of sexual orientation
discrimination to combat the denial in Phillips’ petitioner’s
brief. 355 Rather, the economic impact of the sexual orientation
discrimination was only left for prominent debate for amici—
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and
Neoliberalism, 2014 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2014).
352 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d at 293.
353 Id. (referencing MICH. DEP’ T OF CIV. RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION
U NDER MICHIGAN LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74-90 (Jan. 28,
2013), http://perma.cc/Q6UL-L3JR.
354 Brief for Petitioner at 51, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
355 See Brief for Respondents at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719
(No. 16-111).
351
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between legal scholars who philosophically adhered to law and
economics principles and filed their brief for Phillips’ side, 356 and
scholars who adhered to law and behavioral economics studies
and wrote to undermine Phillips’ position and to debunk the
certainty of law and economics arguments. 357
C. FORGING FORTUITY THROUGH COALITION BUILDING
Following Bell’s theory, others, in the context of race, have
articulated multiracial coalition-building as an important general
strategy for forging fortuity. 358 “Interest,” as Sheryll Cashin
perceives in her study of Bell’s thesis, “is the recognized tactical
or strategic advantage that one racial group can gain by forming
a coalition with another group.” 359 In this sense, she remarks
that “[t]here is a hopeful upside to Bell’s interest-convergence
thesis:
broad coalitions for progressive social change are
theoretically possible when common interests, or a convergence of
enlightened self-interest, can be established.” 360
Cashin’s
examples of such coalition-building that transcends interestconvergence principles include “coalitions among Asians, Latinos,
and blacks [that] tend to be quite strong when formed around
issues that all three groups benefit from, such as eliminating
poverty or unemployment or discrimination.” 361
Patience
Crowder concurs with Cashin in her recent articulation of Bell’s
interest convergence thesis from a transactional perspective:
“[W]ithout significant coalition building among all relevant
interest groups concerned about a particular issue, the
unalignment of interests cannot only undo the outcome that
resulted from a convergence of those interests but can actually
abrogate any progress made during the period of convergence.” 362
See Brief Amici Curiae of Law and Economics Scholars, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
357 See Brief Amici Curiae of Scholars of Behavior Science and Economics,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
358 Bergin, supra n. __, at 302.
359 Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and
Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 278 (2005).
278.
360 Id. at 276.
361 Id. at 278-79.
362 Patience Crowder, Interest Convergence as Transaction?, 75 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
693, 694 (2014).
356
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In Catherine Smith’s work on “outsider” interest convergence,
Smith augments Cashin’s coalition-building idea by adding that
within large coalitions, “members of subordinated groups go even
further and identify how what are perceived to be white middle
class, heterosexual norms and the subordinated groups’
respective group’s failures to conform to those norms serve to
marginalize each group and all groups in the coalition.” 363 Doing
so “may also reveal how we each, even as members of
subordinated groups, play a role in perpetuating the status
quo” 364 and how to respond to it collectively with action. 365
Of course, one danger of coalitions amongst different racial
demographics, as Cashin admits, is how such multiracial coalition
building might break down when specific intra-group ideologies or
antagonism interfere with the cohesion of converging selfinterests. 366 The hurdle of multiracial coalitions is for finding “a
common interest that is significant enough to overcome any
ideological differences.” 367 Scott Cummings responds with two
different takes on overcoming this hurdle. First, he mentions
Reva Siegel’s view that “it is the power of countermobilization in
politics . . . that causes social movements to reframe their claims
in terms that can attract widespread mainstream support.” 368
Secondly, Cummings also restates Gerald Torres’ perspective that
“movements can succeed in shifting cultural norms in progressive
directions so long as ‘non-elite actors have . . . a voice earlier in
the agenda setting process’ thus ensuring the adequacy of their
representation.” 369 Both views give a less worrisome take on the
political differences with large multiracial coalitions.
In the advancement for true equality for sexual minorities,
Bell’s forged fortuity strategies could help combat the cycle of
interest convergence and queer sacrifice that continue to
Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and "Outsider" Interest Convergence, 40
CONN. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (2008) (citing Cashin, supra n. __, at 276).
364 Id. at 1090.
365 See id. at 1092.
366 Cashin, supra n. __, at 279.
367 Id. at 282.
368 Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 360, 386 (2018).
369 Id. at 386-87.
363
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subordinate sexual minorities. Given the complexities between
racial and queer subordinations, some differences in forging
fortuities in the context of race versus sexuality might occur.
However, some commentators within the sexual minority
movement have also noted the need for better coalition building
that shifts the movement away from the professionalized, singleissue, identity politics organizing of recent decades. Through
coalitions, Bell’s theory might bring the movement back to
liberationist roots and view change not just in terms of formal
equality but in terms of transforming the current world—i.e. that
discriminatory status quo. In line with views about coalitionbuilding for the sexual minority movement, some prominent
LGBTQ voices have posited similarly. Political science scholar
Craig Rimmerman notes that “[a] central goal of radical
democratic politics is to build permanent coalitions around
political strategies and concrete public policies that cut across
race, class, and gender divides, coalitions that will be ready to
respond to the Christian Right’s distortions in all political
arenas.” 370 Historian Martin Duberman writes that in the
advancement of sexual minorities the imperative for coalition
building exists. Especially in the post-Obergefell, post-Obama
era, there might be a current spirit for “resistance” but “the parts
do not cohere, and may never—not without a seismic effort to
overcome our penchant for single-issue politics that caters solely
to our own primary concerns.” 371 He urges further “we must
combine with allies who we don’t love but who share with us a
common enemy—the country’s oligarchic structure, its
patriarchal author, and its primitively fundamentalist moral
values.” 372
In the short years before Obergefell, queer activist Urvashi
Vaid wrote that mainstream gay rights organizations’
assimilative approaches have reduced the movement’s goals. 373
In part, this result is so because of the narrow vision of equality
RIMMERMAN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS, supra n. __, at 160.
MARTIN DUBERMAN, HAS THE GAY MOVEMENT FAILED 206-07 (2018).
372 Id. at 207.
373 U RVASHI VAID, IRRESISTIBLE REVOLUTION: CONFRONTING RACE, CLASS, AND
THE ASSUMPTIONS OF LGBT POLITICS 4 (2012) [hereinafter VAID, IRRESISTIBLE
REVOLUTION].
370
371
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that resonates only with the powerful factions of the mainstream
gay movement and causes the movement to conceptualize
changes within the framework of equality that are set ultimately
by the dominant status quo. 374 This notion might add to the
reasons for explaining why the Obergefell and Masterpiece cases
resulted the way they did, and how they extend Bell’s interestconvergence and sacrifice thesis into gay rights, showing that
progress is always “pre-ordained” by the dominant powers at
play. Recognition of sexual identity is not the same as allowing
sexual minorities the ability to also live full lives. 375 The goal is
not just true equality, but human flourishing. Change must
affect the status quo in a way that transforms current hegemonic
ideas about sexual minorities and result in a redistribution of
justice. 376 To that end, Vaid writes that
[w]ithout a more substantive definition of equality,
without a commitment to its extension to all LGBT
people, without deeper and more honest appraisals
of the limits of the traditions to which LGBT people
seek admission, without a willingness to risk gains
made for the opportunity to create a world that truly
affirms the intrinsic moral and human worth of
people’s sexual, racial, and gender difference, the
LGBT politics currently pursued will yield only
conditional equality, a simulation of freedom
contingent on “good behavior.” 377
To displace this continuing phenomenon, she proposes a “justicebased movement” as a type of “re-formed LGBT movement
focused on social justice.” 378 It would be committed to recognizing
the different racial and economic demographics of sexual
minorities 379 and expanding a definition of equality that is more
comprehensive. 380 Such a movement would broaden the missions
of major LGBT organizations, make them more inclusive and
374
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democratic in participation and representation, and force
restructure of their donor schemes that promote assimilationist
strategies. 381
To echo Bell about the over-reliance on the
judiciary, 382 Vaid suggests
[s]hifting the arenas where we concentrate—from
courts to executive and administration agencies, for
example—and then also shifting how we consider the
goal of our work there, from mere recognition or
naming in a regulatory scheme to a consideration of
how it does or does not help the lives and life
chances of our communities, offers a practical path
forward. 383
Lastly, for such a movement to flourish, “we will have to join with
straight allies and create a new powerful electoral majority in
this country.” 384 Here, Vaid arrives at her concept of coalitionbuilding for sexual minorities. Specifically, she mentions that
“[f]or many decades, progressives have talked about the need to
link up with each other beyond identity, around shared values
and goals.” 385 Thus, instead of working in political silos, “[w]e
who have been working for LGBT liberation certainly do not see
our goal as building a gay silo or living in one.” 386 Those moves
would be assimilative. Rather “[w]e see our work instead as
building common ground.” 387 Vaid’s conception of coalitionbuilding is broad, philosophical, and liberationist, compared to
the assimilative methods of lobbying by current mainstream gay
rights organizations. It also approaches Cashin, Crowder, and
Smith’s extensions of Bell’s forged fortuity.
Reaching back to Bell’s iterations of forged fortuity, like
white
dominance,
sexual
minorities
must
presume
388
heterosupremacy at play in everyday ordinary life.
Because of
381
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that supremacy, queer people are often undermined or
subordinated—whether they are planning to get married,
applying for a job, renting an apartment, or shopping for a cake.
Understanding this perspective, sexual minorities ought to be
subversive and work actively to protect self-interest but also not
eager to sell out just to gain access to the dominant status quo. 389
Through inter- and intra-group interest convergence, coalitions
must be formed with other marginalized people; and they must
exist and protest collectively in ways that resemble in spirit the
lunch counter sit-ins that Bell mentioned—against the dominant
status quo as the cost and expense for reinforcing discriminatory
beliefs and practices. The larger and more robust the coalitions
are, the less advantageous it would be in the dominant group’s
interest to sustain discrimination. Together with other groups,
sexual minorities ought to able to create change that is lasting,
transformative, and indeed liberationist.
Scholarly calls for coalition building echo each other. On
more liberationist terms, all of these calls could be workable as
examples of forging fortuity. Within the racial context, the
scholarly observations for coalition building with common
interests externalize Bell’s forged fortuity. Brought into the
sexual minority context, the call for broad coalition building—
particularly one that appears more transformative—echoes the
need not only to combat a continuing inequality imposed against
sexual minorities by those operating within a discriminatory
status quo, but also the need to resolve the intra-group
marginalization between assimilated, elite gays and lesbians and
These
sexual minorities living outside that sub-category. 390
overlapping calls and suggestions for coalition building are more
liberationist than assimilative. Because such coalition building
would hopefully seek to challenge the hegemony and not play into
it, in that sense, a reformed movement that forges its own fortuity
by coalescing around values and issues beyond identity politics
should be broad and should earnestly be investigated as the next
step forward. 391
It invariably ought to dial the LGBTQ

389
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movement’s approaches and tactics back a few degrees
liberationist and some significant degrees more queer.
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual minorities still live at the mercy of the dominant
status quo. By conceptualizing Masterpiece as an example of
queer sacrifice and seeing how Bell’s theory of fortuity fits
appropriately over the progressive ebb and flow of the sexual
minority movement, it is possible to perceive that the movement
needs to forge its own fortuity in order to further
antidiscrimination efforts and effectively reach toward the state
of true equality and human flourishing. To that end, coalition
building that focuses on common values and interests rather than
identity politics might be the solution to press upon upending the
dominant status quo. And within such coalitions, liberationist
approaches might need to guide the movement to advance more
collectively and transformatively.
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